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Fairness and Unfairness in Television Product Advertising 
In a dramatic shift in policy,1 the Federal Trade Commission has 
proposed strict new regulation of children's television advertising. 
On February 28, 1978, the Commission unanimously approved staff 
recommendations to initiate a trade regulation rule that would ban 
all televised advertising directed at preschool-age children, ban tele-
vised advertising directed at children aged up to eleven years of sug-
ared foods , posing high dental-health risks, and require that 
commercials viewed by these older children for other sugared foods 
be balanced by nutrition and health messages financed by advertis-
ers.2 Hearings on these proposals are expected to be lengthy, and the 
affected industries are mobilizing qpposition.3 
Whatever the fate of the FTC initiatives, they have brought into 
sharp focus fundamental questions about the social role of television 
advertising, the need and authority for governmental regulation, and 
the limits to such regulation imposed by the first amendment. The 
FTC has singled out for attention an especially vulnerable and sym-
pathetic class-children. But the powerful messages of television ad-
vertising reach virtually all Americans. Decisions about the 
regulation of children's television advertising will necessarily impli-
cate larger issues of public policy and constitutional rights. 
The purpose of television product advertisements4 is to induce a 
1. The recent history of the Federal Trade Commission's -response to children's television 
advertising practices is set forth in note 168 iefra. 
2. In its notice of rulemaking, the Commission invited comment on whether it should: 
(a) Ban all televised advertising for any product which is directed to, or seen by, 
audiences composed of a significant proportion of children who are too young to under-
stand the sellirig purpose of or otherwise comprehend or evaluate the advertising; 
(b) Ban tefevisea advertising for su~ared food products directed to, or seen 1:iy, audi-
ences composed of a significant proport10n of older children, the consumption of which 
products poses the most serious aental health risks; 
(c) Require televised advertising for sugared food products not included in Para-
graph (b ), whlch is directed to, or seen by, audiences composed of a significant proportion 
of older children, to be balanced by nutritional and/or liealth disclosures funded by ad-
vertisers. . 
FTC Proposed Trade Regulation Rulemaking and Public Hearing, 43 Fed. Reg. 17967, 17969 
(1978). The rulemaking notice indicated that ''young children" referred to those below the age 
of eight and "older children" referred to those aged eight to eleven. Id. at 17969 nn. 16 & 17. 
3. Schorr, Some TV Ads That May Mislead Children Face Ban FrC Staff Plans To 
Recommend, Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 1978, at 10, col. 3. 
4. This Note is primarily concerned with product advertising and thus does not contem-
plate issues involving conventional political advertising or corporate "image" advertising. To 
the extent the latter two forms of advertising contribute to political debate, the first amend-
ment affords them broad protection from regulation. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964). To the extent that corporate "image" advertising affects commercial transac-
tions, it may be subject to regulation by the Federal Trade Commission. See letter from the 
Federal Trade Commission to Senator Thomas McIntyre and several other members of Con-
gress (Apr. 30, 1975), reprinted in 5 TRADE REo. REP. (CCH) ~ 50,231 (1975); address by then• 
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purchase. But, in thirty seconds of sight and sound, each commercial 
conveys countless messages extending far beyond the product to the 
mores, values, and aspirations of our society. Their aggregate impact 
upon viewer attitudes is difficult to ascertain, but accumulating evi-
dence suggests that the impact may be substantial. Some advertise-
ments may color citizens' perceptions of important, controversial 
issues. Some may perpetuate and reinforce psychologically destruc-
tive cultural stereotypes. Some may mislead, affirmatively or tacitly, 
on vital purchasing decisions. Advertising accounts for a significant 
portion of television broadcasting time, and television occupies an 
increasingly significant portion of Americans' lives. For a nation 
committed to "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" political de-
bate,5 to cultural pluralism, and to the health and welfare of its peo-
ple, the impact of television product advertising raises troubling 
questions. 
The first section of this Note explores the impact of television 
product advertising6 on viewer attitudes. The next two sections set 
forth the statutory basis on which the Federal Communications 
Commission and the Federal Trade Commission could provide for 
the effective presentation of contrasting points of view on controver-
sial issues implicitly or explicitly raised by television product adver-
tising, could ensure that the implicit messages of such advertisements 
are delivered fairly and without deception, and could counter the 
adverse effects of such advertising. The purpose of these sections is 
not to predict actual regulatory behavior, for in fact the FCC and 
FTC have shown a reluctance to take any action in these areas. The 
final section considers the constitutional limits on any governmental 
response to television advertising in light of the Supreme Court's 
traditional differentiation between broadcasting and the print media 
and of the Court's recent abandonment of the doctrine that commer-
cial speech enjoys no first amendment protection. 
I. THE MESSAGES OF TELEVISION ADVERTISING 
In the span of three decades, television has emerged as a domi-
nant cultural institution in the United States. The parade of statis-
tics, though familiar, still astonishes. Ninety-seven per cent of all 
American households have a television set and forty-three per cent 
FTC Chairman Lewis A. Engman to the Antitrust Section of the State Bar of Michigan (Feb. 
15, 1974), reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 50,200 (1974); Ludlam, Abatement of 
Corporate Image Environmental Advertising, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 247 (1974). The Federal Com-
munication Commission's "fairness doctrine" covers both forms of advertising if they ex-
pressly address controversial issues. See text at note 71 infra. 
5. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
6. See note 4 S11pra for a discussion of the scope of this term. 
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have two or more.7 The average set is on more than six hours each 
day, with usage increasing to nearly eight hours if a preschool-age 
child is in the home. Today's eighteen-year-old has spent approxi-
mately 22,000 hours in front of a television-more time than in any 
other activity except sleeping-and has watched approximately 
350,000 commercials along with other programming.8 In 1976, ad-
vertisers spent 6.6 billion dollars on television advertising,9 which 
occupies a significant portion of all broadcast time. 10 
The impact of television, and in particular of television product 
advertising, on American society is much more difficult to measure 
than is the pervasiveness of television viewing.11 It has proved easier 
to design and implement communications strategies than to gauge 
their actual effects upon viewer desires, attitudes, and prejudices. So-
cial scientists have struggled to keep pace with rapidly evolving me-
dia technologies and techniques, but they have found that the more 
they learn, the more they need to leam.12 The bulk of advertising 
research, moreover, is confined to analysis of the sales efficacy of 
particular advertising campaigns and provides little information 
about the actual impact of television advertising.13 Given the com-
7. Ricklefs, The Television Era: Three Families Show How Generation of T. V. Has Altered 
L!festyles, Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1976, at 1, col. 1. 
8. On the average, a student graduating from high school has spent 11,000 hours in the 
classroom, which is only approximately half of the time he has spent watching television, Lub-
lin, The Television Era: From Bugs to Batman, Children's TV Shows Produce Adult Anxiety, 
Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1976, at 1, col. 1. 
9. See Lancaster, The Television Era: How TV Commercials Use Ploys and Anxiety To Try 
To Win Viewers, Wall St .. J., Nov. 1, 1976, at 1, col. 1 (figures are 1976 projections). The 
Television Bureau of Advertising has announced a 1980 sales goal of nine billion dollars, 
Advertising Age, Jan. 31, 1977, at 8. 
10. Many broadcast outlets subscribe to the Television Code of the National Association of 
Broadcasters. This code limits the broadcast of ''non-program material" by network-affiliated 
stations to 16 minutes per hour. The limit is 9 1/2 minutes per hour for children's programs 
aired in "prime time" or on a weekend day; it is 12 minutes for children's programs broadcast 
on weekdays outside prime time. NATIONAL ASSN. OF BROADCASTERS, THE TELEVISION CooE 
16-17 (19th ed. 1976). "Non-program" material may be of a nonadvertising nature, 
11. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 
842 (1969); Kottman, Truth and the Image of Advertising, J. MARKETING, Oct. 1969, at 64. 
12. See, e.g., Sheikh, Prasad & Rao, Children's TV Commercials: A Review of Research, J. 
CoM., Autumn, 1974, at 126. 
13. See, e.g., J. KLAPPER, THE EFFECTS OF MAss COMMUNICATION x-xi (1960). In making 
public pronouncements, the advertising and broadcasting firms that have sponsored such re• 
search face an awkward dilemma: to attract clients, they must claim vast persuasive powers; to 
mollify critics, they must disclaim any profound impact. See Foxall, Advertising and the Critics: 
1¥lro Is Misleading 1¥lrom!, 48 ADVERTISING Q. 5 (1976), Advertisers must believe that televi-
sion advertising effectively promotes their products. Thirty seconds of prime-time advertising 
sold for an average of $50,000 to $55,000 in the fall of 1977. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1978, 
National Economic Survey, at 57. But, when confronted with the criticism that massive adver• 
tising of over-the-counter drugs may contribute to a "drug mentality" among younger viewers, 
the National Broadcasting Company published studies purporting to demonstrate that " 'teen-
agers who are exposed to more TV drug advertising are less likely to use illicit drugs.' " 
BROADCASTING, June 7, 1976, at 31 (quoting William S. Rubens, an NBC vice president) 
(emphasis original). 
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plexity of the communication process, one must not mistake ubiquity 
for infl.uence. I4 
Despite the need for caution in assessing this impact, authorities 
agree that the mass media are adept at reinforcing or channeling 
preexistent beliefs of the audience but relatively ineffective in con-
verting the audience to new ones. Is The conclusion does not follow, 
however, that television advertising has a negligible impact upon 
viewers' values and perceptions. I6 First, in a changing society the 
conservative reinforcement of traditional myths, stereotypes, and 
prejudices does have an impact. The least common denominator of 
social consensus, embraced by advertisers in order to maximize ap-
peal and minimize offense, is not value-neutral simply because it is 
broadly tolerated. I7 
Second, studies indicate that the mass media, though having only 
limited ability to alter viewer perceptions radically, may successfully 
bring about small, incremental changes in attitude. Is These minor 
changes are most likely to occur when the viewer entertains two con-
flicting opinions or attitudes-in that circumstance, the media may 
effectively guide the choice between them. I9 Because the public is 
frequently ambivalent about many complex social questions, con-
l 4. See Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and 
Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768, 769 (1972); Lazarsfeld & Merton, Mass Communication, Popu-
lar Taste and Original Social Action, in MASS COMMUNICATIONS 492, 494 (W. Schramm ed. 
1960). 
15. See, e.g., J. KLAPPER, supra note 13, at 15-17; P. SANDMAN, D. RUBIN & D. 
SACHSMAN, MEDIA 15 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as P. SANDMAN). 
16. See Jaffe, supra note 14, at 769-70. 
17. See Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 661 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971), revd on other grounds sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic 
Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); J. KLAPPER, supra note 13, at 38; H. SCHILLER, MAss COM-
MUNICATIONS AND AMERICAN EMPIRE 149 (1969); Lazarsfeld & Merton, supra note 14, at 503-
04. "In America, where commercial control [of media] sanctions only the sanctioned, rebels are 
particularly unlikely to receive much aid from mass media. The essential danger of mass me-
dia in America lies in their ability to inflate existing consent to the point of a dull unanimity, 
and so to achieve social and economic stasis." Klapper, Mass Media and the Engineering of 
Consent, 17 AM. SCHOLAR 419, 428 (1948). 
Recent evolution of Coca-Cola advertising provides an intriguing example of the inter-
play of television advertising and political and cultural attitudes. According to Advertising Age, 
the company's policy is to tailor its advertising campaign to "the mood of the country." In 
1974, to complement its long-running "It's the real thing" campaign, Coke introduced its 
"Look up, America" theme "to accentuate the positive, to provide some relief from Watergate 
problems and the 'down' side of life." The company then discarded both themes in favor of 
"Coke for better times,'' which was accompanied by faster, march-tempo music described as 
reminiscent of "When the Saints Go Marching In." Advertising Age, April 26, 1976, at I. 
Whether Coca-Cola's advertising was effective in distracting the nation from the trauma of 
Watergate is debatable, but it is significant that the company intended both to sell a product 
and to brighten the national self-image. q. D. POTTER, PEOPLE OF PLENTY 188 (1954) (adver-
tising is intended not only to sell the product, but also to shape human standards). 
18. J. KLAPPER, supra note 13, at 17-18. 
19. See id at 44-45. 
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stant exposure through television to a particular idea or attitude may 
significantly shape some viewer perceptions. 
Finally and most critically, it appears doubtful that people's 
resistance to attitudinal conversion extends beyond the explicit com-
mercial message of an advertisement to its implicit cultural 
messages, which Margaret Mead has called "the ad behind the ad."20 
These supplementary, incidental messages may circumvent the con-
scious defenses of the viewer and more readily influence his atti-
tude. 21 An advertisement might not convince viewers to buy a 
particular brand of cigars, but it might reassure them that a woman's 
primary role is sexual omamentation.22 A snack food advertisement 
need not induce a purchase to suggest to the viewer that processed 
snack foods are nutritious.23 Although generally ancillary to adver-
tising's commercial purpose,24 these messages touch upon every as-
pect of American life. Their role in shaping attitudes and opinions 
regarding three issues-the environment, sexism, and nutri-
tion-may be representative. 
The cultural environment modifies people's perceptions of their 
physical environment.25 Perception of environmental concerns as 
"problems:' in tum, is a prerequisite to attention and action.26 Where 
advertising promotes products that harm the environment or en-
dorses values that contribute to environmentally destructive prac-
tices, it may have an impact upon public attitudes on important 
20. Mead, Some Cultural Approaches to Communications Problems, in MASS CoMMUNICA• 
TIONS 329, 340 (W. Schramm ed. 1960). 
21. Id. at 339-40. See Adorno, How To Loo/cat Television, 8 Q. FILM, RADIO, & T.V. 213, 
221 (1954); Gussow, Countemutritional Messages of TV Ads Aimed at Cllildren, 4 J. NUTRITION 
EDUC. 48, 50 (1972); Reed, The Psychological Impact of TV Advertising and the Need for FTC 
Regulation, 13 AM. Bus. L.J. 171, 179 (1975). 
22. For example, in one Muriel cigar television commercial (outline on file at Mic/iigan 
Law Review), workmen are shown doing their jobs. Suddenly, lights illuminate the rear of the 
scene. A blonde woman in a cutaway, string-skirted gown dances across the stage and hands 
cigars to the men. She then sings: 
Turn off the bright lights and turn off the gloom. Great-tasting Muriel will light up the 
room. Light up a Muriel and light up your life. Let in the sunshine wherever you are. 
Reach for a Muriel, it's one great cigar. Light up a Muriel and light up your life. 
23. In one television advertisement, the announcer stated: 
" Like new Hostess Twinkies that golden sponge cake • • • with creamy filling • • • 
now gives your children more than good taste. It gives them important nutrition, too. 
Because now Hostess Twinkies are fortified with body-building vitamins and iron to grow 
on .... Now there are snack cakes with more than good taste. New vitamin-fortified 
Hostess snack cakes. . . . Thank Hostess for the good taste kids love, and good nutrition 
they need." 
ITT Continental Baking Co., 83 F.T.C. 865, 982, modffeed, 83 F.T.C. 1105 (1973), eeforcemenl 
order as modified granted, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting snack cake advertisement). 
24. Seenote 50 i'!fra. 
25. W. BURCH, H. CHEEK & L. TAYLOR, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, NATIONAL RESOURCES, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT 201 (1972). 
26. Murch, Who Cares About the Environmenll, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN ll-12 
(MSS Information Corp. 1974). 
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environmental issues. 27 First, consumers' purchasing decisions affect 
the health of ecosystems. 28 Moreover, as noted above, product adver-
tisements may affect attitudes without successfully inducing 
purchase.29 Thus, a viewer might decide not to buy a snowmobile 
but learn from advertising that snowmobiling is an enjoyable, so-
cially approved recreation.30 The broadcast of advertisements for soft 
drinks in disposable containers when a bill banning no-return bottles 
is pending in a state legislature, for home trash compactors when 
recycling is being urged as a means of solid waste management, or 
for automobiles when a bond issue for public transportation or 
bikeways is before the voters may influence the viewer both as a 
consumer and as a citizen. More generally, the "consumption ethic" 
promoted by television advertising31 may simply overwhelm the 
"land ethic" of respect for the natural environment.32 Where adver-
tising panders an illusion of abundance, where it manifests resources 
~mly as consumer goods, where it glorifies technology as a panacea 
for shortages worldly and spiritual, advertising intervenes in envi-
ronmental controversy.33 The endorsement of energy-intensive, 
high-mobility, throwaway lifestyles in suburban settings is a signifi-
cant social statement with major ramifications for land use, air pol-
lution, and energy conservation. 
The stereotyping of women in television product advertising has 
received extensive documentation.34 A summary of several indepen-
27. Empirical evidence of the impact of product advertising on environmental attitudes is 
negligible. See text at notes 11-13 supra. One limited study of the impact of an advertising 
campaign claiming antipollution benefits of a brand of gasoline reached inconclusive results. 
Sandman, Madison Avenue v. the Environmentalists, 5 J. ENVTL. EDUC. 45, 49 (1973). 
28. See generally P. EHRLICH & A. EHRLICH, POPULATION, RESOURCES, AND ENVI-
RONMENT 196 (2d ed. 1972); A. FRITCHE, THE CONTRASUMERS (1974); P. SWATEK, THE 
USER'S GUIDE TO THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT (1970). 
29. See text at notes 20-21 supra. 
30. See, e.g., WMTW Television (Poland Spring, Maine), Snowmobile Advertiser Texts 
(copy for several snowmobile advertisements) (on file at Michigan Law Review office). In one 
advertisement, snowmobiles are shown roaring across snow-covered slopes as a voice sings: 
Hey Blue .•. Big Blue ... it's a real mobile with a real good feel ... it's a Sno Jet, you 
bet . • • Big Blue . . gotta get goin' while the snow is snowin' . . we'll be riding high . . 
we're goin' to pass them by. We'll take 'em on a hill like they're standing still ... Big 
Blue. Star Jet, SST, Whisper Jet .. they're the Big Blue Sno Jet snowmobiles for 73. And 
with features like the multiplex 2 slide suspension and positrack for fantastic hill climb-
ing. You don't have to look any further for a snowmobile. (Music) Hey Blue .. ridin' 
Blue • . gonna have some fun with a son of a gu.n . . • gonna move on out make the other 
ones run. Be it black or green or yellow . . . it's mean . . • Big Blue. Hey Blue . . . Big 
Blue •.. It's a real mobile with a real good feel ... it's a Sno Jet ... you bet. Big Blue. 
31. See note 50 infra. 
32. See A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC WITH EsSAYS ON CONSERVATION 
ROUND RIVER 236 (1966). 
33. See also Gussow, Consuming in the Year 2000, 76 Tchrs. C. Rec. (Colum. U.) 665 
(1975); White, The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis, in THE SUBVERSIVE SCIENCE 34 
(P. Shepard & D. McKinley eds. 1969). 
34. See, e.g., Busby, Sex-Role Research on the Mass Media, J. CoM., Autumn, 1975, at 107; 
Courtney & Whipple, Women in TV Commercials, J. CoM. Spring, 1974, at 110; Hennessee & 
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dent surveys contrasts the portrayal of men and women in television 
advertising: 
The world for women in the ads is a domestic one, where women are 
housewives who worry about cleanliness and food preparation and 
serve their husbands and children. Seldom is a woman shown combin-
ing out-of-home employment with management of her home and per-
sonal life. 
The picture of men is quite different. Men are portrayed as the 
voices of authority. They are ten times more likely to be used as the 
voice-over. . . . Men are shown in a wide range of occupations and 
roles in both their out-of-home working and leisure lives. Inside the 
home, they are more often portrayed as beneficiaries of women's work 
than as contributors to household duties.35 
More concisely and more bluntly, two commentators have concluded 
that women in television advertising "play two stock roles-the 
housewife-mother or the sex object. In both, they are viewed solely 
in their relation to men."36 Although it is difficult to ascertain the 
precise impact that conservative role models in television advertising 
have in perpetuating these stereotypes,37 surely such stereotyping 
does have psychological, social, and political effects. Women who 
have their own careers and interests may feel guilt and depression,38 
and women generally may refrain from entering professions and 
from engaging in other assertive behavior. The policy decisions of 
persons in positions of power may reflect the stereotyping, and por-
trayals of women content with very circumscribed domestic roles 
may suggest little need for remedial equal-rights legislation. Finally, 
men may be encouraged to treat women as sexual and domestic ad-
juncts and may feel obligated to act dominantly and aggressively. In 
sum, television advertising endorses and helps effectuate a poten-
tially destructive view of social relations.39 
Nicholson, NOW Says: TV Commercials Insult Women, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1972, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 12; Silverstein & Silverstein, Tire Portrayal of Women in Television Advertising, 27 
FED. CoM. B.J. 71 (1974); Note, Ring Around the Collar-Chain Around Her Neck: A Proposal 
To Monitor Sex Role Stereotyping in Television Advertising, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 149, 149-51 
(1976). 
35. Courtney & Whipple, supra note 34, at 116-17. The surveys found that 75% of all 
television advertisements using women are for kitchen and bathroom products. Seventy-eight 
percent of the women are portrayed in a home or family setting, compared to 5% of the men. 
Of the voice-overs (announcers' voices), 87-89% are male. Id. at 111, 113, 115, 
36. Hennessee & Nicholson, supra note 34, at 12. See, e.g., the advertisement discussed in 
note 22 supra. 
37. People tend to emulate models portrayed on television. Busby, supra note 34, at 107, 
125-26; Siegel, Communicating with the Next Genera/ion, J. CoM., Autumn, 1975, at 14, 23. See 
Note, supra note 34, at 152-53. 
38. See generally P. CHESLER, WOMEN AND MADNESS (1972). 
39. See generally s. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1953); M. FASTEAU, THE MALE 
MACHINE (1974); B. FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963). 
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Nutrition is a third area affected by television advertising. The 
twentieth century has witnessed a radical change in the American 
diet. Foods rich in fat and sugar have replaced the complex carbohy-
drates-fruit, vegetables, and grains-as staples. Because fats and 
sugars are low in vitamins and minerals, over-consumption and mal-
nutrition simultaneously pose serious health problems.40 Nutrition-
ists and consumer organizations have increasingly focused their 
concern about this problem on the role of food industry advertising, 
which amounted to twenty-eight per cent of all television advertise-
ment spending in 1975.41 
Numerous studies have shown that much television advertising 
promotes heavily processed foods rich in fats and sugars42 and af-
fects the nutritional concepts of viewers,43 especially children.44 As 
40. See STAFF OF THE SELECT COMMITIEE ON NUTRITION AND HUMAN NEEDS, UNITED 
STATES SENATE, DIETARY GOALS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DI-
ETARY GoALS]. Fats and sugars now account for at least 60% of caloric intake, an increase of 
20% since the early 1900s. Id. at 9. Although dietary quality and income level roughly corre-
late, high income does not insure good nutrition. A 1965 report found that 9% of all house-
holds with greater than $10,000 income had poor diets. AGRICULTURAL REsEARCH SERVICE, 
U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, DIETARY LEVELS OF HOUSEHOLDS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 
(1965), cited in Federal Trade Commission, Staff Statement of Fact, Law, and Policy in Sup-
port of the Proposed Rule and in Support of Affirmative Disclosures in Food Advertising, 39 
Fed. Reg. 39,852, 39,853 (1974) [hereinafter cited as FTC Staff Statement]. 
41. DIETARY GOALS, supra note 40, at 59. In 1975, food advertisers spent $1.15 billion for 
television time. Id. 
42. See, e.g., id. at 59; Choate, The Sugar-Coated Children's Hour, 214 THE NATION 146 
(1972); Goodman, A Limit on Ads far Kids, Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 1976, § A, at 21, col. 5; 
Gussow, supra note 21, at 50; Lublin, supra note 8, at 37, col. 2. 
A 1975 study of four Chicago television stations found that 70% of weekday advertising 
promoted foods high in fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, sugar, or salt. On weekends the figure 
reached 85%. Only 3% of weekday and 1.7 % of weekend food advertising were devoted to 
fruits and vegetables. No advertising promoted fresh vegetables. DIETARY GOALS, supra note 
40, at 59-63. In a one-week test period, one survey found that over 80% of all advertising on 
children's programs was for ingestibles. Gussow, supra note 21, at 49. Ninety percent of these 
ads highlighted the products' sugared, sweetened, or fried ("crisped") properties.Choate, supra 
at 146. 
43. See, e.g., the advertisment noted in note 23 supra. 
44. See, e.g., D. YANKELOVICH, INC., EFFECTS OF NUTRITION LABELING ON FOOD 
PURCHASING (1970) (cited in FTC Staff Statement, supra note 40, at 39,857 n.80); Advertising 
Age, Dec. 20, 1976, at 43; Wash. Star, Nov. 20, 1976, § C, at 1; Atkin, Children's Nutrition 
Learning from Television Food Advertising (unpaginated manuscript of article to appear in 
Journal of Nutn~ion Research during 1977). 
In the absence of authoritative information to the contrary, consumers believe that 
heavily advertised name-brand foods are good products and universally high in nutrition. D. 
YANKELOVICH, INC., supra (as cited in FTC Staff Statement, supra note 40, at 39,857). Chil-
dren who watch a great deal of Saturday morning television are more likely than others to 
believe that sweets are "good for you," and they are more likely to consume the foods adver-
tised. Moreover, this effect generalizes to unadvertised brands of the same product categories: 
dry cereals, candy bars, snacks, desserts, and soft drinks. Atkin, supra. 
Nutritionist Joan Gussow notes that "it is an article of faith among nutritionists that the 
reason we have so much trouble altering people's diets for the better is because eating habits, 
once established, are hard to change. Yet, somehow, between 1928 and 1968, people had 
learned to eat thousands of new food items." Gussow, supra note 21, at 48. Dr. Gussow places 
much of the responsibility on advertising. Id. at 52. 
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food prices rise, ill-informed purchases increase the financial burden 
on the consumer, especially the low-income consumer.45 Television 
food advertising, potentially an effective tool for nutrition and edu-
cation, 46 instead educates viewers to eat nutritionally deficient foods. 
The impact of television product advertising in these three areas 
of public concern suggests the scope and pervasiveness of its societal 
impact.47 As the authority of traditional institutions such as church 
and family has declined, the mass media have played an increasing 
role in transmitting cultural norms and creating consensus.4-8 How-
ever, as historian David Potter observed, television advertising, un-
like more traditional institutions, lacks social responsibility: "[It] has 
45. See FfC Staff Statement, supra note 40, at 39,854; WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON 
FOOD, NUTRITION, AND HEALTH, FINAL REPORT 59 (1970) [hereinafter cited as FINAL RE-
PORT]. 
To the extent that these purchases are ·financed through federal programs, there exists a 
government subsidy of unnutritious food manufacturing. See K. CLARKSON, FooD STAMPS 
AND NUTRITION 1, 56, 62, 76-77 (1975). 
46. Since World War Il, food advertising has represented the largest expenditure for pub-
lic dietary education in the United States. DIETARY GOALS, supra note 40, at 59. The Panel on 
Popular Education and How To Reach Disadvantaged Groups, of the White House Confer• 
ence on Food, Nutrition, and Health, noted the extraordinary influence of television and sug-
gested that ''the gaps in our public knowledge about nutrition, along with actual 
misinformation carried by some media, are contributing seriously to the problem of hunger 
and malnutrition in the United States." FINAL REPoRT, supra note 45, at 179-80. The Panel's 
reco=endations are set forth in note 194 i'!fra. 
47. Empirical evidence of this impact, though persuasive, is not conclusive. As the 
Supreme Court has recognized, however, countless regulations of co=ercial activity are 
predicated upon the "unprovable assumptions" that constitute social consensus. Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61-62 (1973). Cf. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) ("Man's ability to alter his environment has developed 
far more rapidly than his ability to foresee with certainty the effects of his alterations. . . • 
[W]atchdog agencies ... must deal with predictions and uncertainty, with developing evi-
dence, and, sometimes, with little or no evidence at all."); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 
F.2d 492, 520 (8th Cir. 1975) (''the level of probability does not readily convert into a predic-
tion of consequences . . . . The best that can be said is that the existence of this asbestos 
contaminant in air and water . . . creates some health risk. Such a contaminant should be 
removed"). 
Psychologist John Condry, noting the comparison between unforeseen ecological and 
social effects, has suggested: 
Since the pace of change is likely to remain quite high, our survival as a society is in 
· large measure dependent upon our ability to forecast the effects of technological and re-
lated social change, and to reverse a dangerous trend once the dangers become apparent. 
We shall have to be more responsive to tlie way a variety of forces m society interact, and 
more willing to slow the pace of change until we are relatively sure that society can sur-
vive the shock of a given innovation. 
J. Condry, Childhood, Technology, and Society 7 (mimeograph copy of co=ents before the 
FfC Hearings on Television and Children, Nov. 8, 1971, on file at the Michigan Law Review). 
48. See Wirth, Consensus and Mass Communication, in MAss COMMUNICATIONS 561, 574-
75 (W. Schra= ed. 1960); J. Condry, supra note 47, at 3-6. 
Historian Daniel Boorstin has concluded that television advertising has supplanted lo-
cal and regional songs and stories as the new folk culture of modem America. D. BooRSTIN, 
DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 38-42 (1971). Empirical evidence tends to support this 
theory. A majority of mothers surveyed in the Los Angeles area reported that their children 
were singing television advertising jingles by age two; by age three, over 90% had joined the 
chorus. Almost 90% of all three-year-olds personally interviewed could identify Fred Flint• 
stone from a photograph. Siegel, supra note 37, at 22. 
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in its dynamics no motivation to seek the improvement of the indi-
vidual or to impart qualities of social usefulness."49 Instead, this ad-
vertising reflects a distorted image of reality that affirms only those 
values coincident with its commercial purpose. so 
At a time of increasing demands that business be accountable to 
the larger society for its actions, the question arises whether the self-
interested voice of television advertising should be permitted to con-
tinue largely unrestrained and unrebutted. If some governmental re-
sponse is appropriate, it must be based upon a concern for the public 
health and welfare and for the presentation of free, pluralistic dis-
course. The statutory authority for and the constitutional limits to 
such a response require careful examination. 
49. D. POITER, supra note 17, at 177. 
50. Potter identified advertising, along with churches, schools, and businesses, as "an insti-
tution of social control," that is, an institution that "guide[s] the life of the individual by con-
ceiving of him in a distinctive way and encouraging him to conform as far as possible to the 
concept." D. POITER, supra note 17, at 176. Potter did not object to the existence or influence 
of these institutions, as he recognized that they inhere in human culture. But Potter was troub-
led by the "lack of institutional responsibility" he thought unique to advertising: 
[T]hough it wields an immense social influence, comparable to the influence of religion 
and learning, it has no social goals and no social responsibility for what it does with its 
influence, so long as it refrains from palpable violations of truth and decency .... Occa-
sional deceptions, breaches of taste, and deviations from sound ethical conduct are in a 
sense superficial and are not necessarily intrinsic. . . . What is basic is that advertising, as 
such . . . ultimately regards man as a consumer and defines its own mission as one of 
stimulating him to consume or to desire to consume. 
Id. at 177. See also Mead, supra note 20, at 339-43. 
A recent exchange of leters in Advertising Age illustrates the principle of nonresponsibility. 
In one letter, an executive noted a print advertisement for an automobile theft alarm. The 
advertisement featured a smiling woman with beckoning eyes and in a low-cut dress. The copy 
read "Don't say no to a Pro! ... A pro that is used to working on the street!" Letter from 
Robert B. Martin, Advertising Age, Dec. 6, 1976, at 48 (quoting advertisement). The advertis-
ing executive responsible for the ad stated in a subsequent letter: "If the client likes the ad, if it 
reaches the target audience and induces t!J.em to buy, if awareness of the product increases, 
hiking sales, have we not fulfilled our role? I think we have." Letter from T.L. Thome, Adver-
tising Age, Dec. 20, 1976, at 44. 
In some cases, however, these underlying messages are not totally unrelated to the commer-
cial purposes of advertising. For example, reinforcing stereotyped sex roles for women may be 
essential to the sales of some cosmetics or household products, and consumer attitudes towards 
environmental degradation are probably closely linked to the sales strategies for particular 
types of automobiles and recreational vehicles. 
The most common message of product advertising, then, is materialism. To induce con-
sumption, the advertisement must persuade viewers that the acquisition of material goods will 
satisfy their wants. Thus, in the fictive world of the television commercial, people's lives are 
defined by the goods they consume and by the approval of others. In surveying hundreds of 
television commercial scripts reviewed by the Federal Trade Commission, then-Commissioner 
Mary Gardiner Jones found that they espoused two controlling principles: materialism-the 
satisfaction of inner needs by the acquisition or use of things-and external motiva-
tion-personal satisfaction derived from without rather than developed within, such as emu-
lating neighbors. Jones, The Cultural and Social Impact of Advertising on American Society, 
1970 L. & Soc. ORD. 379, 381-84. See also D. RIESMAN, THE LONELY CROWD 97 (1950); H. 
SKORNIA, TELEVISION AND SOCIETY 158 (1965). 
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II. THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE 
Congress has empowered the-Federal Communications Commis-
sion to regulate broadcasting "as public convenience, interest, or ne-
cessity requires."51 In the discharge of this broad mandate, the FCC 
has required that licensees devote a reasonable portion of broadcast 
time to provide fair coverage of opposing views on controversial is-
sues. Where one side of a controversial public issue is raised, the 
broadcaster is under a fairness obligation to provide opportunities 
for the presentation of contrasting views.52 If necessary, the licensee 
must provide the reply programming at its own expense.53 These 
principles comprise the fairness doctrine. It is under this doctrine 
that those discontented with the cultural and political content of tele-
vision advertising have typically brought their grievances. 
Given television's historical dependence upon advertising for fi-
nancial support;54 the proposed application of the fairness doctrine 
to advertising appears to threaten the industry far more profoundly 
than does its application to regular programming. Unlike a conven-
tional fairness ruling, which interferes slightly with the broadcaster's 
editorial discretion, application of the fairness doctrine to advertis-
ing reaches the hand of the public into the broadcaster's pocket-
book. 55 
In this context, the 1967 decision of the FCC-an agency gener-
ally sensitive to the concerns of licensees56-requiring broadcasters 
51. Communications Act of 1934, § 303, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
52. In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). See Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); In re The Handling of Public Issues Under the 
Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, Fairness 
Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fairness Report], petition for reconsideration 
denied, 58 F.C.C.2d 691 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Fairness Report Rehearing]; In re Appli-
cability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 
40 F.C.C. 598 (1964); Houser, The Fairness Doctrine-An Historical Perspective, 41 NOTRE 
DAME LAW. 550 (1972); Comment, The FCC's Fairness JJoclrine in Opera/ion, 20 BUFFALO L. 
REv. 663 (1971). 
53. See Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963). 
54. In the early days of radio, government and private enterprise moved somewhat awk-
wardly by trial and error to resolve the novel problem of devising an effective and appropriate 
means of financing a national broadcasting system. By the advent of television that problem 
had been resolved. From the outset, advertising lias been an indispensable element of televi-
sion. H. SCHILLER, supra note 17, at 26. 
Until the 1950s quiz show scandals, advertisers themselves prepared most pro-
gramming. Today, networks finance the production of programming by selling time to adver-
tisers; to remain on the air programming must not only attract and retain a sizeable audience, 
but also put the audience in a mood receptive to the advertiser's appeal. See P. SANDMAN, 
supra note 15, at 7-8, 135, 139. 
55. There is vigorous debate over the potential economic impact upon the industry of ap-
plication of the fairness doctrine to product advertising. See note 95 infra and accompanying 
text. No one denies, however, that the requirement of reply time to advertisements deemed 
controversial would to some degree reduce broadcasters' revenues by lessening the value of air 
time to advertisers and by replacing some advertisements with unpaid reply broadcasts. 
56. Comment, A Proposed Statutory Righi To Respond lo Environmental Advertisements: 
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to air antismoking messages to counter conventional cigarette adver-
tisements57 seems an act of extraordinary courage or naivete, or 
both. Whatever the explanation for this decision, the Commission 
soon realized the potential ramifications of recognizing that televi-
sion advertisements for arguably hazardous products could give rise 
to fairness obligations and thus attempted to limit its ruling to the 
"unique situation" of cigarette advertising.58 
The "crazy quilt" of FCC decisions that followed as the Commis-
sion struggled to find some logical limitation to the principle under-
lying its cigarette decision has been amply chronicled elsewhere. 59 In 
brief, the Commission refused to apply the fairness doctrine to any 
pure product advertisement, whether it promoted large automobiles 
Access lo the Airways After CBS v . .Democratic National Committee, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 234, 
245-46 (1974) (suggesting that the FCC may be a "captured agency"). 
57. Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967), stay and rehearing denied sub 
nom. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine to Cigarette Advertising, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967), 
qffd. sub. nom. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 
(1969). The Commission's decision responded to a letter from John F. Banzhaf, III, which 
complained that WCBS-TV was presenting only one side of a controversial issue of public 
im}Jortance by broadcasting 
cigarette advertisements which by their portrayals of youthful or virile-looking or sophis-
ticated persons enjoying cigarettes in interesting and exciting situations deliberately seek 
to create the impression ano present the point of view that smoking is socially acceptable 
and desirable, manly, and a necessary part of a rich, full life. 
405 F.2d at 1086. In a brief letter to WCBS-TV, the Commission stated: 
The advertisements in question clearly promote the use of a particular cigarette as attrac-
tive and enjoyable. Indeed, they understandably have no other purpose. We believe that a 
station which presents such advertisements has the duty of informing its audience of the 
other side of t1iis controversial issue of public importance-that, however enjoyable, such 
smoking may be a hazard to the smoker's healtli. 
8 F.C.C.2d at 382. 
As early as 1946, the Commission had acknowledged that product advertising could raise 
controversial issues deserving reply under fairness principles. See In re Sam Morris, 11 F.C.C. 
197 (1946) (dictum). In addition, see In re Broadcast Licensees Advised Concerning Stations' 
Responsibilities Under the Fairness Doctrine as to Controversial Issue Programming, 40 
F.C.C. 571, 572 (1963). Until Banzhafs complaint, however, the principle had not been fully 
applied to product advertising. 
58. Cigarette Advertising, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 943 (denial of stay and rehearing of 8 F.C.C. 
381 (1967)), discussed in note 57 supra. This attempt to limit the applicability of the fairness 
doctrine was made in response to numerous petitions for reconsideration of the Commission's 
decision. In denying the petitions, the Commission dismissed the contention that its ruling 
logically could not be restricted to cigarette advertising. Petitioners argued that because "very 
little in society is uncontroversial," the Commission's theory would also apply to advertising 
for other products, including "automobiles, food with high cholesterol count, alcoholic bever-
ages, flouride in toothpaste, pesticide residue in food, aspirin, detergents, candy, gum, soft 
drinks, girdles, and even common table salt." The Commission, declaring itself unimpressed 
by this "parade of horribles," defended its ruling by stressing the widespread governmental 
and private findings of the serious health hazard posed by cigarettes. Claiming no knowledge 
of any other advertised product warranting response under the fairness doctrine, the Commis-
sion stated that "instances of extension of the ruling to other products upon consideration of 
future complaints would be rare, if indeed they ever occurred." 9 F.C.C.2d at 942-43. 
Congress subsequently prohibited the advertising of cigarettes on television or radio. 
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976). 
59. See Simmons, Commercial Advertising and the Fairness .Doctrine-The New F. CC Pol-
icy in Perspective, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 1083, 1089-100 (1975). 
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and leaded gasolines that contribute to air pollution,60 water-pollut-
ing phosphate detergents,61 or trash compactors that inhibit resource 
recycling. 62 In every case, the Commission either distinguished the 
cigarette ruling on its facts or ignored it entirely.63 The Commis-
sion's attempt to limit its ruling in the cigarette case was temporarily 
thwarted, however, by the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit in Friends of the Earth v. FCC.64 In reviewing the 
FCC's dismissal of the complaint in the automobile and gasoline ad-
vertising case, the court found the circumstances indistinguishable 
from those of cigarette advertising and ordered the Commission to 
impose the fairness doctrine's reply requirements upon broadcasters 
of advertisements for large automobiles and leaded gasoline, 65 Faced 
with the option of either implementing the far-reaching principle im-
plicit in the cigarette ruling or repudiating it altogether, the Commis-
sion chose the latter. 
On July 12, 1974, the Commission released its long-awaited Fair-
60. Friends of the Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743 (1970), revd., 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
61. William H. Rogers, Jr., 30 F.C.C.2d 640 (1971) . 
. 62. John S. Macinnis, 32 F.C.C.2d 837 (1971). 
63. For example, in Friends of the Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743 (1970), discussed in note 60 
supra and accompanying text, the Commission reiterated its assertion that cigarettes are a 
"unique product" for purposes of the fairness doctrine. The Commission distinguished ciga-
rettes from other products by stating that "the Government is not urging people to stop 
now-without any delay-buying or using gasoline-engine automobiles, detergents, or elec-
tricity. The benefits and detriments here are of a more complex nature, and do not permit the 
simplistic approach taken to cigarettes." Second, the Commission concluded that no one 
would propose a ban on all broadcast advertising of automobiles, as Congress had done in the 
case of cigarettes. Finally, the Commission proposed that remedial action be directed at the 
environmentally offensive products themselves, suggesting that the national experience with 
liquor prohibition had shown this direct approach impracticable for cigarettes, but not for 
automobiles. 24 F.C.C.2d at 746-47. 
64. 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
65. The court, in an opinion by Judge McGowan, rejected the Commission's attempt to 
distinguish cigarettes as a unique threat to human health: 
The distinction is not apparent to us, any more than we supEose it is to the asthmatic 
in New York City for whom increasing air pollution is a mortal danger. Neither are we 
impressed by the Commission's assertion that, because no governmental agency has yet 
urged the complete abandonment of the use of automobiles, the commercials in question 
do not touch upon a controversial issue of public importance. Matters of degree arise in 
environmental control, as in other areas oflegal regulation .... Commercials which con-
tinue to insinuate that the human personality finds i;reater fulfillment in the large car with 
the quick &etaway do, it seems to us, ventilate a pomt of view which not only has become 
controversial but involves an issue of public imJ?ortance. When there is undisputed evi-
dence, as there is here, that the hazards to health tmplicit in air EOllution are enlarged and 
aggravated by such products, then the parallel with cigarette aclvertising is exact and the 
relevance of Banzhij"inescapable. 
449 F.2d at 1169. The court further commented: 
It is obvious that the Commission is faced with great difficulties in tracing a coherent 
pattern for the accommodation of_product advertising to the fairness doctrine ..•. Pend-
mg, however, a reformulation of its position, we are unable to see how the Commission 
can plausibly differentiate the case before us from Banzhef insofar as the applicability of 
the fairness doctrine is concerned. 
449 F.2d at 1170. 
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ness Report,66 the first major reconsideration and reformulation of 
the fairness doctrine since its inception. The Commission first reiter-
ated the first amendment justification for the doctrine but acknowl-
edged the danger of "undue governmental interference in the 
processes of broadcast journalism, and the concomitant diminution 
of the broadcaster's and the public's legitimate First Amendment in-
terests."67 Turning to the application of the fairness doctrine to ad-
vertising, the Commission noted its traditional respect for the central 
role of advertising in the broadcast industry68 and emphasized that it 
"must proceed with caution so as to ensure that the policies and 
standards which are formulated in this area will serve the genuine 
purposes of the doctrine without undermining the economic base of 
the system."69 
Proceeding with its self-admonished caution, the Commission 
announced that the fairness doctrine would apply only to those paid 
announcements that are "overtly editorial."70 Thus, a fairness obli-
gation arises when an advertisement "presents a meaningful state-
ment which obviously addresses, and advocates a point of view on, a 
controversial issue of public importance," but not "[i]f the ad bears 
only a tenuous relationship to [public] debate, or one drawn by un-
necessary inference."71 The licensee need only make a "common 
sense judgment" on this difficult question and will be overruled only 
if that judgment is unreasonable or in bad faith.72 Conventional 
product advertising, moreover, was declared wholly beyond the 
66. Fairness Report, supra note 52. 
67. Id at 6. 
68. The FCC stated that the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), the predecessor to the 
FCC, had "placed advertising in its proper context and perspective" in 1929. Id at 22. Al-
though broadcasters were licensed to serve public interests, the FRC asserted that advertising 
constituted an "exception" to this rule "because advertising furnishes the economic support for 
the service and thus makes it possible." 3 F.R.C. ANN. REP. 32 (1929), cited in Fairness Report, 
supra note 52, at 22. Although the FCC did not attempt similarly to remove advertising wholly 
from the operation of its congressionally mandated "public interest" standard, these deferen-
tial remarks indicated its policy preferences. 
69. Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 22. 
70. Id 
71. Id at 22-23. An example of an editorial advertisement, the Commission noted, would 
be an advertisement urging a constitutional amendment concerning abortion. 
72. Id. at 23-24. The broad discretion afforded the broadcaster and the strict wording of 
the standard would seem to relieve the broadcaster of fairness response duties in all but the 
most extreme cases. To trigger the fairness doctrine, the advertisement must do more than 
merely address a controversial issue in a general way; it must advocate a "point of view" and 
must do so "obviously." Id at 23. In deciding if the advocacy is "obvious," the licensee need 
only exercise "common sense." Id Thus, advocacy that might be "obvious" to the psychologist 
or public relations expert but not to one exercising only "common sense" does not trigger 
fairness obligations. 
The line between.product advertising and editorial or "image" advertising is not always 
distinct. See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety, 32 F.C.C.2d 926 (1972). Under this test, it seems 
likely that most corporate advertising intended to influence public opinion and political deci-
sionmaking may escape any fairness response. 
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reach of the fairness doctrine.73 Stating that the purpose of the doc-
trine is "to facilitate 'the development of an informed public opin-
ion,' " 74 the Commission ,concluded that "standard product 
commercials, such as the cigarette ads, make no meaningful contri-
bution toward informing the public on any side of any issue."75 In-
deed, since product commercials are not informative in this sense, 
presentation of opposing views under the fairness doctrine would, 
according to the Report, "provide the public with only one side of a 
public controversy."76 
The Commission's discussion of the very difficult problem of ap-
plying the fairness doctrine to product advertising is unsatisfying in 
several respects. The Commission's concern over the first amend-
ment rights of broadcasters is misplaced.77 In upholding the doctrine 
as applied to regular programming against challenge under the first 
amendment, the Supreme Court has declared that, because broad-
cast licensees are but trustees of the public airwaves, "it is the right 
of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which 
is paramount."78 Still, there may be legitimate concern where appli-
cation of the doctrine interferes with editorial policy by "chilling" 
broadcast coverage of controversial subjects because of the threat of 
fairness obligations.7 9 
73. Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 24-26. 
74. Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 24 (emphasis original) (quoting In re Editorializing 
by Broadcast Licensees, supra note 52, at 1249). 
75. Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 24. The report quoted the assertion in Banzhaf that 
cigarette commercials are " 'at best a negligible "part of any exposition of ideas."' " Id. at 25 
(quoting Banzhaf, 405 F.2d 1082, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969), 
quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
76. Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 25. The Commission rejected a Federal Trade Com-
mission proposal that the public be provided broadcast time to respond to certain product 
advertisements. Id. at 26-28. See note 152 infra. 
77. This first amendment concern is discussed in the text at note 67 supra. In addition, see 
Fairness Report Rehearing, supra note 52, at 708 (dissenting statement of Commissioner 
Robinson); Simmons, supra note 59, at 1108-10. 
The status of product advertising as constitutionally protected speech is discussed in 
Part IV infra. 
78. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
The Supreme Court has recognized the first amendment value in avoiding "the risk of 
an enlargement of government control over the content of broadcast discussion of public is-
sues." Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 126 (1973). 
Although it rejected on this ground a proposed "right of access" scheme to be monitored by 
the FCC, the Court did reaffirm the constitutional propriety of the FCC's administration of 
fairness doctrine requirements. See412 U.S. at 126-27. 
79. This concern was dismissed as "speculative" in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 
395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969). Moreover, the FCC has reported "no credible evidence" of any such 
chilling effect on broadcasters' editorial policies. Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 8. 
The potential "chilling effect" of a state statute establishing a "fairness doctrine" for 
newspapers led the Supreme Court to strike down the statute as an unconstitutional interfer• 
ence with the editorial discretion of the-print media. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 
418 U.S. 241 (1974). The Court in Miami Heraldvirtually ignored the similarities between the 
statute involved in that case and the FCC's fairness doctrine as applied to broadcasters and 
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Although this concern might normally caution against imposing 
fairness obligations, different interests are present in the context of 
product advertising. It might well be that broadcasters have no first 
amendment interest in product commercials.80 They sell time to pay-
ing customers, subject only to occasional subjective judgments re-
garding "good taste."81 The broadcaster provides the medium for 
advertising, not the message. 
Under this analysis, the first amendment interest at stake, if any, 
is the advertiser's. 82 The Supreme Court has recently noted that 
commercial speech "may be more durable than other kinds. Since 
advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little 
likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and foregone en-
tirely."83 If an advertisement for a controversial product such as cig-
arettes triggered a fairness reply, the advertiser would not likely 
cease advertising.84 However, if the advertisement were controversial 
not because of the product itself, but because of other, unrelated con-
tent such as sexual stereotyping, the advertiser would have somewhat 
less incentive to protect the controversial message. To the extent that 
such advertisements are "chilled" merely by the prospect of rebuttal 
under the fairness doctrine, the advertiser's position evokes little 
sympathy: the first amendment does not protect the speaker from 
free and open debate. The more realistic concern is not that advertis-
ing will be chilled but rather that the network will decline to run the 
offending advertisement, or at least strongly request that it be with-
drawn or modified in order to avoid fairness doctrine obligations. 85 
found constitutionally valid in Red Lion. It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss the 
constitutionality of the FCC's fairness doctrine, but it is likely that the Court will continue to 
distinguish between the first amendment rights of the print media and of broadcasters. See 
generally Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regu-
lation of the Mass Media, 75 MrcH. L. REV. l (1976). 
80. See Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D.D.C. 1971), qffd. 
mem. sub nom. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972) (cigarette adver-
tising). 
8 l. See NATIONAL ASSN. OF BROADCASTERS, supra note IO, at 12. Of course, those broad-
casters who do not subscribe to the NAB Code are not subject to any of its requirements. 
82. See, e.g., Reply Comments of America Petroleum Inst. at IO, Fairness Report, supra 
note 52. The Fairness Report did not discuss the first amendment interests of the advertiser. 
83. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
771 n.24 (1976). 
84. During the period when cigarette advertising was subject to the FCC's fairness doc-
trine, cigarette advertising time on television did not decline significantly. See Comment, And 
Now a Word Against Our Sponsor: Extending the FCC's Fairness JJoctrine to Advertising, 60 
CALIF. L. REV. 1416, 1446 (1972). Advertisers might, of course, counteract the fairness doctrine 
by shifting some of their advertising expenditures to media not subject to fairness obligations, 
thereby reducing broadcasters' revenues. 
85. Because of its economic reliance on advertising, the television network is far less likely 
to resist an advertisement for a controversial product, the controversial nature of which the 
advertiser of course cannot avoid, than to resist controversial advertising content, which the 
advertiser can avoid. 
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This result might, loosely speaking, be considered a "chill."86 But 
a chill is constitutionally impermissible only if the speech withheld is 
protected by the first amendment. It would have been inconsistent 
for the FCC to allow potential "chilling effects" to preclude applica-
tion of the fairness doctrine to product commercials, for at the time 
of the Fairness Report the Commission apparently did not believe 
that product advertising warranted constitutional protection.87 The 
Supreme Court's recent decisions extending some constitutional pro-
tection to commercial speech,88 which have emphasized the public's 
interest in receiving product information, 89 might raise concern 
about possible chilling of advertiser's speech. However, as this Note 
concludes in Part IV, the noninformational content of television ad-
vertising does not have first amendment protection. Application of 
the fairness doctrine to product advertising seems not to threaten 
first amendment interests; rather, by encouraging full discussion of 
controversial issues, it would appear to advance the public's first 
amendment right to be informed,9° 
The fundamental error of the Fairness Report, however, is that it 
86. The expression "chilling effect" arose in recognition of the need to protect individuals 
from statutes threatening criminal sanctions or loss of employment for vaguely defined restric-
tions of expression or association. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 
(1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 
365 U.S. 43, 74 n.11 (1961) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). The FCC has applied the term to the 
potential financial disincentive to broadcasters to cover subjects triggering fairness doctrine 
obligations. See Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 7. The application of the concept to adver-
tisers' difficulties in their relations with networks and the resulting impact on their marketing 
strategy, see Reply Comments of American Petroleum Inst., supra note 82, seems attenuated, 
87. See note 75 supra and accompanying text. 
88. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U .S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Town-
ship of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), See 
generally Part IV infra. 
89. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v, Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 8S, 96 (1977), 
90. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). To the extent that, 
contrary to the FCC's position, the controversial advertising message does enjoy constitutional 
protection the chilling of advertisers' speech again becomes cause for concern. This Note sug-
gests that, except for information about the product, television product advertising is not so 
protected. See Part IV infra. 
Several citizens' organizations have challenged the validity of the Commission's distinc-
tive treatment of product advertising by asserting that the first amendment not only permits 
but compels applying the fairness doctrine to product advertising. See Brief for Petitioner 
Council on Economic Priorities and Intervenor United Farm Workers at 3-28, Nationnl Citi-
zens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 55S F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [hereinafter cited as 
UFW Brief]. The brief argues that, in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. 
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), the Supreme Court constitutionnlized the fairness doctrine by 
leaving it the sole guardian of viewers' first amendment rights, and that the Court's opinion in 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 42S U.S. 748 
(1976), prohibits absolute distinction of commercial from political speech, UFW Brief, supra at 
15-23. While the District of Columbia Circuit cited Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc, v. Demo• 
cratic Natl. Comm., the court did not consider the fairness doctrine. SSS F.2d at 9S3. q. Note, 
The Fairness /Joctrine and Access to Reply to Product Commercials, SI IND. L.J, 7561 766-82 
(1976) (discusses the first amendment and commercial speech). But cf. Part IV Infra. 
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equates lack of discourse with lack of impact.91 The FCC contended 
that because product commercials make no meaningful contribution 
to public debate, the airing of opposing views is purposeless; if com-
mercials do not truly "inform," their broadcast can create no 
counteracting duty to inform.92 Yet the Commission's recognition 
that television commercial "speech" is unworthy of first amendment 
protection93 hardly compels the conclusion that the implicit messages 
of product advertising should never give rise to fairness obligations. 
On the contrary, speech that does not rise to the level of the first 
amendment may nonetheless call for a reasoned response-and per-
haps more urgently requires such a response.94 The FCC's distinc-
tion serves to protect the subtle, implicit, nonrational message. The 
appeal that plays upon biases and emotions rather than intellect is 
rewarded with immunity from rebuttal. 
It may be that in actuality the Commission was most concerned 
about the economic ramifications for broadcasting should standard 
commercials require opportunities for reply, but preferred to rely 
primarily on arguments relating to the public interest rather than to 
the financial self-interest of the industry. Certainly the hotly con-
tested economic issue is a serious one.95 However, when confronted 
with evidence that questioned the potential economic impact of ap-
plying the fairness doctrine to product commercials, the Commission 
disclaimed reliance on economic considerations in the adoption of its 
new fairness policy.96 If economic considerations were not determi-
native of the Commission's decision, then that decision apparently 
91. See Note, supra note 34, at 159-60. 
92. See Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 24-25. 
93. The Fairness Report quoted language from Banzhqfthat treated television commercial 
"speech" as unworthy of first amendment protection. Id. at 24-25 (quoting Banzhaf v. FCC, 
405 F.2d 1082, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969)). The current status of 
product advertising as constitutionally protected speech is discussed in Part IV in.fra. 
94. This principle was included in the Banzhef decision, which approved the imposition of 
fairness doctrine requirements upon broadcasters of television advertisements.The Commis-
sion's position thus inverted the logic of Banzhef. 
95. See the various positions taken in Petition for Reconsideration and Rehearing on Be-
half of Council of Economic Priorities, Project on Corporate Responsibility, and Intervenor 
United Fann Workers at 2-5, Fairness Report, supra note 52; Reply Comments of National 
Broadcasting Co. at 11-17 & Attachments A & B, Fairness Report, suprO', Comments of Co-
lumbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. (Oct. 12, 1971) at 13-23, Fairness Report, suprO', Loevinger, The 
Politics ef Advertising, 15 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1, 8-10 (1973); Simmons, supra note 59, at 
1110-13; Comment, supra note 84, at 1444-49; Note, supra note 90, at 776-78. 
96. Responding to petitions for reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 52, the 
Commission stated: 
The Commission was given [by petitioners] inconclusive statistics and told that it should 
have held a hearing on the economics of broadcasting before concluding that extension of 
the doctrine to product advertising would be detrimental to commercial broadcasting. The 
extensive proceedings in this docket provided more than ample opportunity for that ques-
tion to be raised. Clearly, however, the economic impact on the broadcasting industry was 
only one of many factors contributing to our choice of policy, and that factor alone IS not 
of such critical importance as to cause a change of policy. 
Fairness Report Rehearing, supra note 52, at 698-99. 
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turned on the unpersuasive constitutional arguments previously dis-
cussed and thus appears arbitrary97 and contrary to the best interests 
of the viewing public. 
If, as seems more likely, fear of economic consequences was more 
influential than the FCC cared to admit,98 then any ambiguity about 
the fmancial impact of application of the fairness doctrine to product 
advertising should be resolved by thorough study. Even if applica-
tion of the doctrine is found to pose a substantial threat to the cur-
rent system of privately fmanced broadcasting, broadcasting's first 
responsibility must be to the public. Where the fmancial structure of 
broadcasting would limit the paramount first amendment "right of 
the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, 
moral, and other ideas and experiences,"99 the industry must adapt 
itself to the first amendment, not vice versa. 100 
Consistent with the policy announced in the Fairness Report, the 
FCC has routinely disposed of fairness claims arising from product 
advertising. 101 Several of these complaints dealt with the environ-
ment OJ' sexism, two of the issues previously suggested as illustrative 
of the role of advertising in society. 102 A brief examination of two 
such claims will demonstrate the shortcomings of the new fairness 
policy. 
97. Several citizens' organizations have charged lhat lhe Fairness Report's distinctive treat-
ment of product advertising is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion in violation of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). See UFW Brief, supra note 90, 
at 51-60. But see Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060, 1066 (1st Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976). 
98. Many supporters as well as critics of lhe FCC's exclusion of product advertising from 
fairness doctrine coverage have assumed lhat lhe economic factor was "critical." See, e.g., 
Simmons, supra note 50, at 1107; Note, supra note 90, at 764. 
99. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1968). 
100. One commentator has suggested lhat lhe Commission thought it more appropriate to 
leave to Congress lhe regulation oflhe sale and advertising of products lhat are dangerous to 
heallh or olherwise detrimental to lhe public interest. See Note, supra note 90, at 764. This 
argument ignores the possibility lhat product advertising makes important, albeit implicit, 
statements concerning controversial issues such as environmental degradation, sexism, or nu-
trition regardless of lhe actual public danger caused by lhe particular advertised product, 
IOI. See Council on Children, Media, and Merchandising v. ABC, 59 F.C.C.2d 448 (1976) 
(advertisements directed at children); In re Storer Broadcasting Co., 58 F.C.C,2d 468, 474 
(1976) (sex-stereotyped advertisements; license application); In re Complaint by Natl. Health 
Federation, 58 F.C.C.2d 314 (1976) (flouride representations in toothpaste advertisements); In 
re Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 56 F.C.C.2d 313, 315-16 (1975) (automobile and gasoline 
advertisements; license application); In re Application of National Broadcasting Co., 52 
F.C.C.2d 273, 287 (1975) (sex-stereotyped advertisements); In re Application of American 
Broadcasting Co., 52 F.C.C.2d 98, 116 (1975) (sex-stereotyped advertisements); In re Com-
plaint oflhe Sierra Club, 51 F.C.C.2d 569 (1975) (automobile and gasoline advertisements); In 
re Complaint of lhe Sierra Club, 48 F.C.C.2d 617 (1974) (snowmobile advertisements); Peter 
C. Herbst, 48 F.C.C.2d 614 (1974), petition far reconsideration denied, 49 F.C.C.2d 411 (1974), 
o/.(d. sub nom. Public ;rnterest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir, 1975), cert, 
denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976) (snowmobile advertisements). 
102. See text at notes 25-39 supra. 
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One of the fastest growing and most controversial recreational 
pastimes in the United States is snowmobiling. While enthusiasts 
praise the mobility these vehicles have brought to residents of wintry 
northern regions, critics complain of hazards to riders, excessive_ 
noise, injurious trespassing on private land, and ecological disrup-
tion.103 In the winter ,of 1973, as the Maine legislature was studying 
proposals for regulating snowmobiles, four snowmobile manufactur-
ers conducted intensive, prime-time advertising campaigns on local 
television stations.104 Although the advertisements made no mention 
of the pending legislative proposals, protest letters written to one of 
the stations alleged that the commercials stated a controversial view-
point by associating snowmobile use with "the good life" and by en::-
couraging disregard of safety, environmental concerns, and private 
property rights. When the station failed to respond promptly the 
protesters took their case to the FCC and elaborated on many of 
their contentions. 105 At this point, the s~ation answered that the ad-
vertisements raised no fairness question because they did not advo-
cate the "misuse" of snowmobiles.106 The complainants responded 
that whether the issue was characterized as " 'misuse,' " " 'abuse,' " 
or " 'proper use,' " the advertisers had involved themselves in a pub-
lic controversy that triggered fairness obligations.107 
In rejecting the complaint, the FCC conceded that "hazardous 
operation, adverse environmental effects and interference with pri-
vate property rights by snowmobiles may constitute controversial is-
sues,'' but declared that the snowmobile advertisements were not, by 
the standard set forth in the Fairness Report, devoted" 'in an obvi-
ous and meaningful way to the discussion' " of t4ese issues.108 The 
Commission thus simply reiterated its unrealistic distinction between 
advertising content and impact. Although complainants offered no 
empirical evidence of the effect of the advertising on the views of 
Maine residents, a heavy ad campaign presenting snowmobiles in a 
favorable light almost certainly played a part in shaping public atti-
tudes.109 By ignoring this role, the FCC shirked its responsibility to 
ensure a fair presentation by broadcasters of opposing viewpoints. 110 
103. See Comment, Snowmobiles-A Legislative Program, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 477, 477-79. 
104. An advertisement from the campaign is reprinted in note 30 supra. Excerpts from 
other advertisements are reproduced in Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 
1060, 1062, n.2 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976). 
105. 522 F.2d at 1062. 
106. 522 F.2d at 1063. 
107. 522 F.2d at 1063 (quoting protesters' complaint). 
108. Peter C. Herbst, 48 F.C.C.2d 614, 615-16 (1974), petition for reconsideration denied, 49 
F.C.C.2d 411 (1974), affd. sub nom. Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060 (1st 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976). 
109. See text at notes 15-23 supra. 
I IO. It should be noted that the television station had offered to air a single half-hour 
discussion program on the pending snowmobile legislation. The complainants took the posi-
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An examination of sexism in product advertising illustrates the 
general proposition that advertisements for noncontroversial prod-
ucts may themselves be controversial if the appeal conveys a particu-
lar position on an issue of public importance. In 1975, the National 
Organization for Women (NOW) petitioned the FCC to deny the 
license renewal applications of a television station in New York 
City111and another in Washington, D.C.112 NOW charged, inter alia, 
that in routinely depicting women in both programming and adver-
tising as subservient, incompetent, and frequently ridiculous, the sta-
tions had violated the fairness doctrine by presenting a "one-
dimensional" view on the controversial issue of women's role in soci-
ety.113 Because the controversy arose in the setting of license renewal 
proceedings, the FCC considered petitioners' f~irness doctrine alle-
gations as only one aspect of the licensees' overall performance.114 
Even in this context, however, the Commission gave NOW's fairness 
claim very short shrift. Citing the Fairness Report, it concluded that 
petitioners' descriptions of the women's roles portrayed in the en-
tertainment programs and product advertising were "too insubstan-
tial or ambiguous for us to determine that the mere playing of the 
role transmits any clear or singular message demonstrably linked to 
a controversial issue of public importance." 115 In light of research 
indicating that televised cultural stereotypes do influence viewer per-
ceptions, 116 the FCC's flat refusal to consider the fairness implica-
tions of sexually stereotyped product advertising, though consistent 
with the policy announced in the Fairness Report, seems difficult to 
justify. 
Given the considerable legal and financial resources that have 
been and are being expended to persuade or compel the Commission 
to include product advertising within the purview of the fairness 
doctrine, one must determine how much would be gained by apply-
ing the doctrine to product advertising. This determination can best 
tion that one program "could not offset months of repeated and continuous ads." 522 F.2d at 
1063. 
111. In re Application of American Broadcasting Co. (ABC), 52 F.C.C.2d 98 (1975). 
112. In re Application of National Broadcasting Co. (NBC), 52 F.C.C.2d 273 (1975), 
113. 52 F.C.C.2d 273, 282-85; 52 F.C.C.2d 98, 109-11. Documentation for this allegation 
consisted of monitoring and survey projects conducted by NOW. 52 F.C.C.2d at 282-85; 52 
F.C.C.2d at 109-11. To demonstrate the existence of a substantial public controversy concern-
ing women's societal role, NOW cited numerous popular and scholarly articles, government 
reports, and public opinion polls. ABC, 52 F.C.C.2d at 109. Neither licensee contested this 
point. 52 F.C.C.2d at 286; 52 F.C.C.2d at 115. 
114. NOW also alleged that the stations had failed to provide programming that met the 
needs of women in their co=unities and had engaged in discriminatory employment prac-
tices. NBC, 52 F.C.C.2d at 286. 
115. NBC, 52 F.C.C.2d at 287. Comparable discussion ofNOW's fairness allegations re• 
garding the ABC-owned station appears at 52 F.C.C.2d at 116. 
116. See Note, supra note 34, at 152-53; note 37 supra. 
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be made by examining the operation of the doctrine as currently ap-
plied by the Commission. Clearly the doctrine has not led the broad-
cast media to off er viewers a spectrum of political and social views. 
The Commission has historically deferred to the judgment of the li-
censee in determining whether a controversial issue has been 
raised. 117 If a controversial issue is found, the licensee again enjoys 
broad discretion in choosing the format, content of, and spokesper-
son for the responding broadcasts.118 Although the Commission dis-
approves of "imbalance" in the presentation of contrasting 
yiewpoints, it has declined to establish a minimum ratio to guarantee 
meaningful reply time.119 Furthermore, in reviewing licensee deci-
sions the Commission has been extremely reluctant to find that a 
broadcaster exercised its discretion unreasonably or in bad faith. 120 
In exercising such broad discretion at every stage of the fairness pro-
cess121-to judge what is controversial, who should reply, and how 
and when~licensees will generally make judgments reflecting the 
cultural biases of their managers and owners, who are typically af-
fluent, white, male, and busin~ss-orlented.122_ Consequently, the in-
clusion of product advertising within fairness doctrine coverage, as 
the doctrine is presently applied, is unlikely to increase significantly 
the presentation of contrasting viewpoints on controversial issues. 123 
If, on the other hand, the fairness doctrine were applied to afford 
meaningful reply time to all controversial presentations, whether in 
advertising or programming, it might seriously threaten the financial 
welfare of the broadcast industry.124 Nearly every commercial on the 
117. Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 11. See, e.g., In re Storer Broadcasting Co., 60 
F.C.C.2d 1097 (1976); In re Media Access Project, 60 F.C.C.2d 218 (1976). 
118. Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 16. See, e.g., Public Media Center v. KATY, 59 
F.C.C.2d 494, 517 (1976). In addition, see Comment, supra note 56, at 234, 243 n.43. 
119. Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 17. But cf. Public Media Center, 59 F.C.C.2d 494 
(1976) (FCC ruling that 8 of 13 licensees failed to afford adequate reply time to political 
advertising). For a discussion of the problems of balance, see Comment, supra note 84, at 
1436-44. 
120. During 1973-1974, the FCC processed 4,280 formal fairness complaints and ruled 
against the licensee in only 19 (.4%). Fairness Report Rehearing, supra note 52, at 709 (Com-
missioner Robinson, dissenting). 
121. See generally Note, supra note 90, at 758 n.7. 
122. See P. SANDMAN, supra note 15, at 101. 
123. The classification of a product advertisement as controversial, 
0
which gives rise to the 
presentation of views attacking the advertiser's produce, jeopardizes the licensee's financial 
interest because the advertiser may refuse to purchase further broadcast time. "Accordingly, 
there would be an incentive for the broadcasters not to classify an advertisement as raising 
fairness obligations." Comment, supra note 56, at 244-45. 
124. Those who suggest that extension of the fairness doctrine to product advertising might 
not cut too deeply into broadcasting revenues apparently assume that only limited types of 
product advertising would trigger fairness obligations. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 84, at 
1446-47. It has been argued in this regard that some controversial paid commercials might be 
effectively balanced by other paid commercials, which would fulfill at least part of the licen-
see's fairness responsibility without any financial burden. For example, phosphate detergent 
ads might be countered by ads for nonphosphate detergents, and ads for big cars might be 
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air might be considered offensive or at least controversial by some 
substantial minority of Americans. 125 If these groups were to benefit 
fully from the fairness doctrine, the financial burden imposed on 
broadcasters would undoubtedly be great. 126 
Even within the context of current broadcasting economics, how-
ever, the Commission could, by appropriate line drawing, apply the 
fairness doctrine in a -manner that recognizes the political and cul-
tural impact of product advertising. Whether an advertisement ad-
dresses a controversial issue could be determined by objective 
evidence of actual or potential impact on viewer attitudes rather 
than by a mechanical examination of the script. To screen out mar-
ginal claims of controversy, fairness obligations arising from adver-
tising could be triggered, for example, by findings in an approved 
public opinion survey or by the pendency of legislative or adminis-
trative action specifically pertinent to the subject matter of the ad. 127 
Despite its past vicissitudes, the fairness doctrine continues to 
serve the public interest and should not be abandoned. 128 So long as 
balanced by ads for small cars. See UFW Brief, supra note 90, at 4 n.l. This argument is 
unpersuasive because advertising, even when directly comparative, does not rebut. See 
Lazarfeld & Merton, supra note 14, at 476-77. Comparative advertising, however, typically 
seeks to increase the advertiser's share of sales in a single product category-e.g., soft drinks, 
cigarettes, or a particular class of automobile. This advertising obviously will not challenge 
attributes of the product class itself. On the other hand, advertising for competing product 
categories, e.g., cigars versus cigarettes, rarely discusses the merits of the product category with 
which the advertised product competes. 
125. Two sources of legitimate controversy in all product advertising are the ethic of con-
sumption, see text at notes 31-33 supra, and capitalism. See generally BROADCASTING, April 
26, 1976, at 39. 
If only television advertisements dealing with a few specific issues were deemed to be 
controversial, reply broadcasting time could be restricted to allowing general responses to all 
advertising raising those issues. Interview with Peter M. Sandman, Associate Professor, The 
University of Michigan School of Natural Resources, in Ann Arbor, Michigan (Feb. 1, 1977) 
[hereinafter cited as Interview]. However, every advertisement implicates a host of issues, 
many of which are controversial to substantial factions of the public. New controversies, more-
over, erupt continually. 
126. One communications scholar has suggested that the gravest threat to broadcasting 
posed by fairness doctrine reply time would be the enhancement of viewers' awareness, which 
would deny advertisers a passive audience receptive to subrational commercial appeals. Inter-
view, supra note 125. 
127. Cf. Note, supra note 90, at 775, suggesting several criteria for determining whether a 
product was controversial, including whether it was related to the subject of an upcoming 
referendum, to an election issue in a campaign office, to the subject of pending legislation, or 
to the subject of heated debate in the service area of a broadcasting station. The use of such 
criteria would serve to remove some of the discretion currently given licensees to determine 
whether a controversial issue has been raised, a necessary step if the fairness doctrine is to 
ensure the presentation of contrasting views. However, the increased governmental infringe• 
ment upon editorial discretion may upset the balance between governmental control and edi-
torial discretion noted as being desirable in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic 
Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), discussed in note 78 supra. 
128. The fairness doctrine may be linked to the public's first amendment right of access to 
information. See Note, Constitutional Ramifications of a Repeal of the Fairness J)octrine, 64 
GEO. L.J. 1293 (1976). 
The doctrine provides political leverage to groups whose power to influence broad-
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access to the airwaves is limited by technology, 129 oligopoly, 130 or 
advertising's imperative to accommodate mass tastes, 131 the fairness 
doctrine will remain essential to ensuring some public exposure to 
contrasting viewpoints on issues of public importance. However, as 
presently applied the fairness doctrine falls far short of its lofty pur-
poses, and the FCC is unlikely to extend even this limited version of 
the doctrine to product advertising, the economic basis of the indus-
try. Thus, it is useful to consider other policy tools that might 
counter the impact of the implicit messages accompanying product 
advertisements. 
III. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND DECEPTIVE 
OR UNFAIR ADVERTISING 
Under the authority granted by Congress in section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act132 the FTC shares jurisdiction over tele-
vision advertising with the FCC. While the FCC is concerned with 
ensuring that broadcasting serves the "public interest" in the 
broadest sense, 133 Congress created the Federal Trade Commissi9n 
for the specific purpose of protecting the integrity of commerce from 
practices deemed predatory or contrary to public policy.134 Initially 
casters is otherwise meager. Much of this leverage will arise because a station may attempt to 
acco=odate complainants' concerns rather than incur the expense and adverse publicity of 
contesting a fairness complaint. Interview, supra note 125. 
129. Although cable television (CATV) has been heralded as a solution to the problems of 
limited access to television, its prospects are uncertain. See, e.g., R. LE Due, CABLE TELEVI-
SION AND THE FCC (1973); R. SMITH, THE WIRED NATION (1972); Branscomb, The Cable 
Fable: Will It Come True?, J. Com., Winter, 1975, at 44; Comanor & Mitchell, The Costs of 
Planning: The FCC and Cable Television, IS J. L. & EcoN. 177 (1972). 
130. In April 1972, the Department of Justice filed suits against the three major networks 
charging restraint and monopoly of prime-time progra=ing through control of prime-time 
access. The National Broadcasting Co. has settled; the other suits are pending. BROADCAST-
ING, Nov. 22, 1976, at 21. In response to a petition by Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., the 
FCC has announced a major inquiry into charges that networks dominate broadcasting at the 
expense of affiliate and "other progra=ing sources." BROADCASTING, Jan. 17, 1977, at 19. 
Barring sudden, radical changes in government policies, however, network domination of the 
broadcast industry is likely to continue. 
131. See note 17 supra and accompanying text. 
132. Federal Trade Commission Act§ S(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l) (1976), grants the FTC 
authority to regulate "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting co=erce." 
133. Mindful of the statutory warning against censorship contained in the Co=unica-
tions Act of 1934, § 326, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970), and of Justice Brandeis' belief that the best 
remedy for fallacious speech is more speech, Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 
(1927) (concurring opinion), the FCC initiated the fairness doctrine so that voices other than 
those favored by broadcasters could be heard. 
134. This distinction has arisen in the context of FTC jurisdiction over corporate "image" 
advertising. Noting limitations imposed by both the FTC Act and the first amendment, the 
Commission has ruled that its jurisdiction over deceptive image advertising is restricted to 
those of which "the dominant appeal or likely effect" is co=ercial, ie., concerning "the sale 
of goods or services or the elicitation of other co=ercial dealings." FTC Letter, supra note 6, 
at 55, 424. See generally Ludlam, supra note 6. 
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restricted to relationships among competitors, FTC authority now 
extends to protection of the consumer as well. 135 Although the FTC's 
concern for consumers generally centers around the consumer's role 
in commercial transactions, the agency has exercised its jurisdiction 
over "unfair" trade pract~ces that threatened injury even where the 
potential victims were not actual or prospective consumers. 136 Un-
like the FCC, whose remedies are generally limited to prescribing 
more speech, the FTC has available a variety of options to remedy 
unfair or deceptive practices. Upon determining that -an advertising 
practice is unfair or deceptive within the meaning of section 5, the 
FTC may order disclosure137 or correction 138 by the advertiser or 
may proscribe the practice by order139 or rule. 140 
The FTC has both the experience and the authority necessary to 
confront the problems raised by the power and impact141 of televi-
sion advertising. Even though lawyers, and hence most governmen-
tal agencies, tend to read an advertisement as if it were a contract by 
focusing on the literal meaning of its terms, 142 the FTC has, at least 
on occasion, proved itself capable of responding to the reality behind 
and beyond the words. For example, 'in 19'64 the Commission, by 
requiring a health warning in all cigarette advertisements, recog-
nized that social responsibility to the consumer must accompany the 
exercise of the extraordinary power of advertising. Intensive mass 
media advertising, the Commission asserted, 
is a form of power in the market place-power over the buying choice 
of consumers. It is lawful power. But just as the possession of lawfully-
acquired market or monopoly power in the antitrust sense may never-
theless place a firm under 3: special duty of fair dealing toward its com-
petitors, an advertiser's possession of great power vis-a-vis consumers 
may place him under a special duty of fair dealing toward them. . . . 
The duty exists even if no individual advertisement, viewed in isola-
tion, is deceptive under conventional principles. 143 
The FTC's response to cigarette advertising thus recognized not 
merely the strict meaning of words, but also their actual influence 
135. See Developments in the Law---lJeceptiveAdvertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1019-21 
(1967) [hereinafter cited as lJeve!opment.i'J. 
136. See note 168 infra. 
137. See note 174 infra. 
138. See note 177 infra and accompanying text. 
139. Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45b (1976). 
140. Federal Trade Commission Act, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1976). 
141. See text at notes 7-9 & 16-47 supra. 
142. See J. HOWARD & J. HULBERT, ADVERTISING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 49-50 
(1973) (staff report to the FTC). 
143. FTC, Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule, Unfair or Deceptive 
Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. 
Reg. 8324, 8357 (1964) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Cigarette Statement]. 
January 1978] Television Product Advertising 523 
and impact.144 
Viewed in this light, the FTC's contribution to the FCC's 1971 
inquiry into the fairness issues raised by television advertising145 is 
both intriguing and disappointing. In contrast to the FCC's content-
oriented approach to advertising, 146 the FTC emphasized the power 
and influence of television advertising147 and recognized that prod-
uct advertisements "often raise issues, directly or implicitly, that re-
late to some of the nation's most serious social problems--drug 
abuse, pollution, nutrition and highway safety." 148 Asserting that 
its own regulatory tools were inadequate to respond fully to these 
problems, 149 the FTC proposed that interested groups be given free 
"counter-advertising" time to discuss controversial issues implicitly 
raised and negative product attributes left unmentioned by television 
product advertisements. 150 This proposal drew vigorous criticism 
144. The FTC finds its authority to regulate the implicit messages that affect consumers in 
§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). The FTC views that section 
as a mandate "to create a new body oflaw-a law of unfair competition adapted to the diverse 
and changing needs of the complex and evolving modem American economy." Cigarette 
Statement, supra note 143, at 8349 (footnote omitted). 
An FTC staff report on advertising notes that, despite the difficulty of transition from 
traditional legal analysis, the FTC is "attempting to shift to more behaviorally oriented evalu-
ative criteria." J. HOWARD & J. HULBERT, supra note 142, at 50. 
145. See In re The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public 
Interest Standards of the Communications Act, Notice of Inquiry, 30 F.C.C.2d 26, 29-33 
(1971). The inquiry resulted in issuance of the Fairness Report, supra note 52, discussed in text 
at notes 66-100 supra. 
146. See text at notes 71-76 & 91-94 supra. 
141. See Statement of the FTC Before the FCC, In re The Handling of Public Issues 
Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 
Part III: Access to the Broadcast Media as a Result of Carriage of Product Commercials 2-7 
(1972) [hereinafter cited as FTC Statement]. The FTC pointed out that television advertising is 
dominated by a relatively small number of corporations. Id. at 4. The FTC also noted: 
Advertising today is largely a one-way street. Its usual technique is to provide only one 
carefully selected and presented aspect out of a multitude of refevant product characteris-
tics. Advertising may well be the only important form of public discussion where there 
presently exists no concomitant public debate. At times, this may produce deception and 
aistortion where the self-interest of sellers in disclosure does not coincide witl:i the con-
sumer's interest in information. 
All of these elements of the modem-day advertising mechanism combine to endow 
broadcast advertising with an enormous power to affect consumer welfare. 
Id. at 6-7. 
148. Id. at 5. 
149. Id. at 11. The Commission noted that, in proceeding through typically prolonged and 
costly administrative litigation, the Commission must make difficult choices among cases in 
allocating its limited resources. Moreover, litigation "may be a relatively unsatisfactory mech-
anism for determination of the truth or accuracy of certain kinds of advertising claims" and for 
dealing with truthful but controversial advertisements. Id. at 7-8. Requiring substantiation of 
advertising claims, the Commission continued, is effective only for claims "objectively verifia-
ble" and is constrained by limited agency resources. Id. at 8-9. Finally, the FTC stated that 
disclosure requirements cannot furnish the consumer with all needed product information and 
cannot take the place of an advocate's criticism or supplementary presentation. Id. at 9-11. 
150. See id. at 11-19; Thain, Advertising Regulation: The Contemporary FTC Approach, 1 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 349, 390-92 (1973). 
The FTC recommended that a right of access to broadcasting be afforded for response 
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from advertisers-and broadcasters151 and finally was rejected by the 
FCC, which accorded it only cursory discussion in the Fairness Re-
port.1s2 
to four categories of product co=ercials. First, such a right would arise to counter 
"[a]dvertising asserting claims of product performance or characteristics that explicitly raise 
controversial issues of current public importance." FTC Statement, supra note 153, at 13. The 
FTC included in this category both corporate image advertising, see notes 6 & 72 supra, and 
product claims of, for example, environmental or nutritional benefits. FTC Statement, supra 
note 147, at 13. Second, the right to respond would reach "[a]dvertising stressing broad recur-
rent themes, affecting the purchase decision in a manner that implicitly raises controversial 
issues of current public importance." Id. at 14. The FTC elaborated as follows: 
Advertising for some product cate~ories implicitly raises issues of current importance 
and controversy, such as food ads which may oe viewed as encouraging poor nutritional 
habits, or detergent ads which may be viewed as contributing to water pollution. Simi-
larly, some central them'es associated by advertising with various product categories con-
vey general viewpoints and contribute to general attitudes which some persons or groups 
may consider to oe contributing factors to social and economic problems of our times. For 
example, ads that encourage reliance upon drugs for the resolution of personal problems 
may be considered by some groups to be a contributing cause of the problem of drug 
misuse. 
Id. at 14-15 (footnotes omitted). 
The third category of advertising that the FTC felt should give rise to a right to respond 
would be "[a]dvertising claims that rest upon or rely upon scientific premises which are cur-
rently subject to controversy within the scientific co=unity." Id. at 15. The FTC acknowl-
edged its authority to prohibit as deceptive the presentation or implication of a controversial 
claim as established fact, but the Commission suggested that counter-advertising would be 
preferable because the public would hear both sides of the debate. Id. at 16-17. Finally, the 
right to respond would reach "[a]dvertising that is silent about negative aspects of the adver-
tised product." Id. at 17. As an example, the FTC suggested that 
in response to advertising for small automobiles, emphasizing the factor of low cost and 
economy, the public cou1d be informed of the views of some J)eople that such cars are 
considerably less safe than larger cars. On the other hand, ads for big cars, emphasizing 
the factors of safety and comfort, could be answered by counter-ads concerning the 
greater pollution arguably generated by such cars. In response to advertising for -some 
foods, emphasizing various nutritional values and benefits, the public might be informed 
of the views of some people that consumption of some other food may be a superior 
source of the same nutritional values and benefits. 
Id. at 18. 
151. See, e.g., Response of the American Association of Advertising Agencies to Statement 
. of the Federal Trade Commission, The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine 
and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act (1972); Reply Co=ents of the 
National Association of Broadcasters [NAB] to the Statement of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest 
Standards of the Communications Act, Part III: Access to the Broadcast Media as a Result of 
Carriage of Product Co=ercials (1972). The NAB asserted that, "through its proposals, the 
FTC, the agency charged with the duty to police advertising, is sidestepping its own statutory 
responsibilities and attempting to foist on the FCC and the public obligations which neither is 
equipped to assume." Id. at 4. The NAB went on to state that "[t]he public interest is ill-served 
by an administrative agency which fails to make every effort to discharge its statutory duties, 
no matter how overwhelming or onerous they may seem." Id. at 10. 
152. See Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 26-28. As to the first two categories of advertis-
ing that the FTC felt should give rise to a right to respond, see note 150 supra, the FCC simply 
referred to its prior conclusion that product commercials cannot meaningfully address public 
issues. See text at notes 74-76 supra. Generally, the FCC complained that the FTC's categories 
"seem to include virtually all existing advertising .... We believe that the adoption of the 
FTC proposal-wholly apart from a predictable adverse economic effect on broadcast-
ing-might seriously divert the attention and resources of broadcasters from the traditional 
purposes of the fairness doctrine." The FCC concluded: "We do not believe that the fairness 
doctrine provides an appropriate vehicle for the correction of false and misleading advertis-
ing." Fairness Report, supra note 52, at 26-27. 
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The FTC "counter-advertising'' proposal is intriguing because it 
represented both an innovative, if unpolished, attempt to grapple 
with the social and political impacts of television product advertising 
and an unusually candid call for help from one federal agency to 
another. The proposal was disappointing, however, because the FTC 
itself already possessed ample authority to respond creatively to the 
serious and complex problems in this field. 
Traditionally the FTC has concerned itself only with deceptive 
advertising-a concept broad enough to reach many of the objec-
tionable features of television commercials. Advertising that is liter-
ally truthful may be unlawfully deceptive in the "general 
impression" it conveys to the "populace" about a product. 153 More-
over, unlawful misrepresentation is not confmed to the particulars of 
the product itself, but may also concern such "extrinsic" factors as 
the country of its origin or the scope of the manufacturer's busi-
ness.154 
Frequently the impressions conveyed by product advertisements 
are at least partially the result of subtle psychological techniques. 
Television commercials are not deceptive merely because they use 
psychological appeals155 to convey a favorable product image. 
Rather, they are deceptive because the images they convey are often 
153. Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676,679 (2d Cir. 1944). The FTC 
need only determine that an advertisement has the capacity to deceive, not that actual decep-
tion has occurred. 143 F.2d at 679. Thus, the FTC employs the standard not of the reasonable 
person, but rather of "the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous." Aronberg v. FTC, 132 
F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942). 
154. See, e.g., FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933) (firm calling itself a "milling 
company" did not grind flour); Mohawk Ref. Corp. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 818 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 361 U.S. 814 (1959) (re-refined oil not so labeled); Manco Watch Strap Co., Inc., 60 
F.T.C. 495 (1962) (product's foreign origin not disclosed). See generally Note, "Extrinsic Mis-
representations" in Advertising Under Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 114 U. 
PA. L. REV. 725 (1966). 
False implications about facts such as the environmental impact of an automobile or 
the nutritional value of a food item often interfere with rational consumer product selection in 
much the same manner as does false information about a product's origin or the scope of a 
manufacturer's business. See Note, The Regulation of Corporate Image Advertising, 59 MINN. 
L. REV. 189, 210 (1972). In many cases, misinformation about impact or nutrition would bear 
much more directly on consumer decisions, given the current concern for the environment and 
nutrition. 
155. Demand is inevitably both economic and psychological. See J. HOWARD & J. HUL-
BERT, supra note 142, at 82-83. Psychological "self-concept" appeals are, of course, inherent in 
certain product categories, such as cosmetics and clothes. Id at 54. Numerous studies have 
demonstrated that the informational content of advertising bears little or no relation to 
changes in the viewers' attitudes or behavior. See, e.g., Haskins, Factual Recall as a Measure of 
Advertising Effectiveness, J. ADVERTISING RESEARCH, March 1964, at 2. As psychologist Roger 
Brown has put it, "[w]e should not expect a symbol-using animal to live by meat and drink 
alone." R. BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 568 (1965). 
Given that demand is both economic and psychological, suggestions that the psy-
chological component be purged from advertising and that the consumer be permitted to make 
a purely "rational" choice, see, e.g., Reed, supra note 21, at 180-82; Note, Psychological Adver-
tising: A New Area of FTC Regulation, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 1097, 1108-11, are misdirected. 
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false, in that they are contradicted by undisclosed facts. Such psy-
chological appeals should, if not factually substantiated, 156 at least 
not be at odds with provable reality. 
Advertising need not be a comprehensive consumer's guide that 
sets forth every merit and demerit of a product potentially relevant 
to the purchasing decision. However, the law of deceptive advertis-
ing does forbid misrepresentation of facts, even "extrinsic" facts, ca-
pable of affecting a significant number of purchasers' decisions. 157 
This principle, in conjunction with the "general impression" test dis-
cussed earlier, 158 offers an appropriate standard for disclosure: inf or-
mation directly contrary to a factual impression conveyed by an 
advertisement must be presented when it is likely to affect the con-
sumption decisions of a substantial number of persons. Obviously, 
that standard requires informed and thoughtful line drawing, which 
can best be developed on a gradual, case-by-case basis. 159 Properly 
applied, the FTC authority to regulate deceptive advertising could 
156. An FTC staff report has proposed that substantiation requirements be applied to im• 
plicit psychological claims as well as to factual claims. See J. HOWARD & J. HULBERT, supra 
note 142, at 54. The practical difficulties of this approach appear obvious: it may be inter-
preted as a back-door attempt to eliminate psychological appeals altogether, which is an im-
possibility. 
157. Whether tacit or explicit, a misrepresentation is unlawful if material-that is, if it is 
capable of affecting the purchasing decisions of a substantial number of consumers. See Ciga-
rette Statement, supra note 143, at 8352; J)eve/opmenls, supra note 135, at 1056-63. 
158. See note 153 supra. 
159. The FTC made this point when it required cigarette advertising to disclose the health 
hazards of smoking: 
[T)he principle reguiring disclosure of a product's hazards in labeling and advertising 
should not be applied mechanically or uncritically, or pushed to an absurd extreme. It can 
be applied only on the basis of the SJ;>ecific and concrete facts and circumstances pertain-
ing to the product involved. . . . It 1s a question of judgment. . . . 
Cigarette Statement, supra note 143, at 8363. At that time, the FTC argued that cigarettes were 
distinguishable from other hazardous products promoted by mass media advertising. Id. at 
8361-63. 
More recently, the Commission has rejected a petition for rulemaking based on impres-
sion-disclosure theory. Senator James Abourezk (D.-S.D.), noting that "advertisers frequently 
exploit a general consumer preference to purchase from a small or family-owned company" by 
the use of misleading brand names or appeals, requested that the FTC require disclosure of the 
advertiser's parent corporation. Letter from Senator Abourezk (co-signed by five other sena-
tors) to Mr. Calvin J. Collier, FTC Chairman (April 5, 1976) (on file at the Michigan Law 
Review). Senator Abourezk cited as examples Pepperidge Farm baked goods (Campbell Soup 
Co.), Sara Lee baked goods (Consolidated Foods Corp.), and Celeste Pizza, advertised as 
"'Mama's' Old Family Recipe" (Quaker Oats). News Release of Sen. James Abourezk (Apr. 
5, 1976) (on file at the Michigan Law Review). Abourezk also asserted that such disclosure 
would help counteract specious product differentiation by a single manufacturer-for exam-
ple, detergent manufacturers that create an illusion of meaningful competition. Id. In denying 
the petition, the FTC stated that it lacked evidence either that current practice misleads a 
significant number of persons to their detriment or that a consumer preference for small man-
ufacturers exists. The acquisition of such evidence, according to the Commission, would re-
quire the expenditure of significant resources. Furthermore, it stated that mere disclosure of 
corporate affiliation would not better inform the consumer about the product. Letter from the 
Federal Trade Commission (Charles A. Tobin, Secretary) to Senator James Abourezk (June 
15, 1976) (on file at Michigan Law Review). 
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go a long way toward alleviating much of the objectionable impact 
of television commercials. 
The deceptiveness cfoctrine is not the only standard available to 
FTC regulation of television advertising, since the Commission also 
has authority to prohibit commercial practices that are "unfair." In 
recent years attention within and without the Commission has fo-
cused increasingly upon the question whether an advertisement that 
is not strictly "deceptive" may nonetheless be considered "unfair." 
The Supreme Court's opinion in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson 
Co., 160 though arising in the general context of antitrust principles 
rather than advertising,161 gave an expansive reading to the Com-
mission's authority to regulate "unfair" commercial practices. Not-
ing the "sweep and flexibility" of the FTC's mandate, 162 the Court 
stated that 
the Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive power to 
itself if, in measuring a practice against the elusive, but congressionally 
mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers pub-
lic values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed 
in the spirit of the antitrust laws. 163 
Continuing in a footnote, the Court cited, with apparent ap-
proval, 164 criteria adopted by the Commission for determining 
whether a practice that is not deceptive is nonetheless unfair: 
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously 
considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established 
by statutes, the common law, or otherwise-whether, in other words, it 
is within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or 
other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, un-
ethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial 
injury to consumers ( or competitors or other businessmen). 165 
Notwithstanding the expansive reading given to the scope of the 
FTC unfairness authority in Sperry & Hutchinson, the encourage-
ment of commentators, 166 and the public statements of its staff, 167 
the Commission has made only limited efforts to give substance to 
160. 405 U.S. 233 (1972). 
161. The Court's discussion in Sperry & Hutchinson demonstrates that its reasoning applies 
to the full breadth.of FTC authority. Neither FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 
(1934), relied upon by the Court in Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. at 242-43, nor the FTC's 
unfairness criteria, quoted in text at note 165 supra, involved antitrust considerations. 
162. 405 U.S. at 241. 
163. 405 U.S. at 244. 
164. See Note, supra note 155, at 1108-11. 
165. 405 U.S. at 244-45 (citing Cigarette Statement, supra note 157, at 8355). 
166. See, e.g., Note, supra note 155, at 1106-11. 
167. In 1971, Gerald J. Thain, then-Assistant Director for Food and Drug Advertising of 
the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection, anticipating the favorable decision in Sperry & 
Hutchinson, discussed "the Unfairness Doctrine" as an emerging theory of FTC regulation of 
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its unfairness authority in the advertising field. 168 Just as psychologi-
advertising. Thain, Consumer Protection: Advertising-The FTC Response, 26 FooD, DRUO, 
CosM. L.J. 609, 616•23 (1971). He stated that 
the Unfairness Doctrine ... is potentially of great value in dealing with exploitive or 
ineguitable practices that do not fall within established categories of unfair or deceptive 
activity. In my view, it is exceedingly important that the Commission develop such tools, 
for it JS becoming increasingly apparent that traditional approaches are not adequate to 
deal with the problems created 6y modem mass media advertising. . . . The consumer, 
unwary of the new advertising techniques, is placed in a vulnerable and easily exploitable 
position. . . . Since television occupies a central place in most households, the viewer is 
continuously en~ulfed with messages which educate, messages which set standards, and 
messages which mstill drives. Attitudes and life styles are most certainly influenced by the 
medium. Thus, the importance of understanding the new television advertising, as well as 
new advertising in general, cannot be overemphasized. 
Id. at 621·22. Two years later, his initial optimism tempered by experience, Mr. Thain re-
ported that "[d]ealing with advertising other than that which is simply misinformative •.• has 
been ... difficult. However, the Commission of the 1970's will, in my judgment, be compelled 
to focus increasingly on these problems." Thain, supra note 150, at 393. 
More recently, Richard B. Herzog, Assistant Director of the FTC's Division of National 
Advertising, Bureau of Consumer Protection, has suggested that the FTC has the authority to 
proceed against advertising that can be shown to encourage abuse of alcohol. Statement of 
Richard B. Herzog Before the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Narcotics, Senate Committee 
on Labor and Public Welfare (March 11, 1976) (on file at Michigan Law Review). Noting that 
§ 5 prohibitions of unfairness and deceptiveness reach "implied representations" even if not 
intended by the advertiser, Mr. Herzog stated that "an ad would be particularly suspect if it 
suggested-frankly or, perhaps, symbolically-that alcoholic beverages are a means of coping 
with social or emotional difficulties, including loneliness, frustration, or tension, or if it por-
trayed behavior or personality characteristics distinctively present in alcohol abusers." Id. at 5. 
However, Mr. Herzog cautioned that the lack of conclusive evidence of the actual impact of 
such advertising is a "basic constraint" on governmental response. Id. at 1 I. 
168. The Commission has proceeded under its § 5 authority against television advertising 
practices that may result in physical injury to children. See Uncle Ben's, Inc., 3 TRADE REo. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 21,246 (1976) (commercial showing child placing her face close to pot of boiling 
rice); General Foods Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 20,928 (1975) (commercial sug-
gesting that wild plants are edible). Cf. Philip Morris, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 
20,153 (1972) (distribution of sample razor blades in home-delivered newspapers). Absent a 
threat of physical injury, however, the Commission has exercised little initiative in the area of 
nondeceptive unfair advertising. 
Presumably the easiest cases for use of the unfairness theory involve advertising di-
rected at children. Since children are an especially vulnerable audience, too young and inexpe-
rienced to respond discriminatingly to commercial appeals, extraordinary legal protections 
have traditionally been extended to them. See FTC Staff Statement on the Application of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act to Television Advertising of Child-Directed Premiums, Pro-
posed Industry Guide, 39 Fed. Reg. 25505, 25505-10 (1974). Moreover, the landmark case 
establishing the FTC's power to proceed against ''unfair" practices not otherwise unlawful, 
FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1934), concerned a lottery-type scheme promoting 
the sale of candy to children, who were deemed by the Court to be "unable to protect them-
selves." 291 U.S. at 313. Until very recently, however, the Commission had declined to find 
any inherent deception or unfairness in television food advertising directed at children. Letter 
from the FTC to Action for Children's Television, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 50,229 (1975). 
See also ITT Continental Baking Co., 83 F.T.C. 865 (1973), modified, 83 F.T.C. 1105 (1973), 
enfarcement of order as modified granted, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976), discussed in note 194 
infra. It abandoned its proposal to prohibit television food advertising directed at children that 
uses premiums or sweepstakes. Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1977, at 2, col. 4. In 1976, however, the 
FTC approved a consent order prohibiting children-oriented vitamin advertisements that fea-
tured Spider-Man, a popular television and comic book hero. See Hudson Pharmaceutical 
Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 21,191 (1976). Although the complaint leading to the 
consent order alleged both deceptiveness and unfairness, the advertisements were not decep-
tive in the traditional sense. , 
Finally, on February 28, 1978, the Commission initiated rulemaking proceedings to 
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cal appeals in television product advertising are not "deceptive" 
merely because they are psychological, 169 neither are they necessar-
ily "unfair." However, at the very least, advertising appeals should 
be considered unfair under the "substantial injury to consumers" test 
where their cumulative effect can be shown to be harmful to viewers' 
mental health. 17° Furthermore, as the Court in Sperry & Hutchinson 
suggested, the public policies expressed in statutory and common 
law present an additional basis for a finding of unfairness. 171 Conse-
quently, television commercials should also be considered "unfair" 
when they exploit and cultivate desires and prejudices that contra-
dict societal principles manifested in American law.172 
consider strict generic regulation of children's television advertising. See note 2 supra. In sup-
port of its proposals, the staff report reasoned: 
The remedy described in paragraph (a) follows from the conclusion that televised 
advertising directed to children too young to understand the selling purpose of, or other-
wise comErehend or evaluate, commercials is inherently unfair and deceptive. The rem-
edy descnbed in paragraph (b) reflects the conclusion that the most canogenic sugared 
products should not be advertised to children on television. The remedy described m (c) 
reflects the view that those products of lesser cariogenicity should be advertised to chil-
dren only if balanced by nutritional and/or health disclosures addressed to that group. 
4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 38,046 (1978). 
The FTC has never found an advertisement directed at adults to be unfair unless it was 
also deceptive. Although some cases of deceptive advertising involve messages that seem of-
fensive or unfair regardless of their truthfulness, the Commission has relied essentially on the 
deceptiveness theory. See, e.g., Savitch v. FTC, 218 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1955); J.B. Williams Co. 
(1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 19,671 (1971). 
169. See note 155 supra and accompanying text. 
170. See 405 U.S. at 244 n.5, quoted in text at note 165 supra ("substantial injury to con-
sumers"). The FTC has already proceeded against advertising appeals endangering the physi-
cal health of viewers. See note 168 supra. 
171. 405 U.S. at 244, quoted in text at note 163 supra. 
On at least one occasion, the FTC staff has, apparently without considering whether its 
concerns were consistent with public values, attempted to proscribe advertisements that were 
alleged to exploit consumer concerns unfairly. In ITT Continental Baking Co., 83 F.T.C. 865, 
modffeed and qffd., 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976), the FTC's complaint alleged that respondent's 
advertisements were ''unfair" because they tended ''to exploit the emotional concerns" of par-
ents for the healthy growth of their children by misrepresenting the nutritional value of Won-
der Bread and tended ''to exploit the guilt feelings [of mothers] regarding the nutritional effect 
of snack cakes on children's diets" by misrepresenting the nutritional value of Hostess snack 
cakes. 83 F.T.C. at 872, 874. The FTC, reasoning that these unfairness allegations relied on the 
falseness of the advertising claims, declined to consider their unfairness as a separate issue. 83 
F.T.C. at 962-64. 
172. This standard would require precisely the kind of judgment the Supreme Court en-
dorsed in Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233 (1972), discussed in the text at notes 161-65 supra. 
Application of the standard in the illustrative subject areas of environment, sexism, and nutri-
tion is discussed in the text at notes 178-204 supra. 
This standard is similar to the kind of judgment suggested by Margaret Mead when she 
called for the development of "an ethic of communications" that would insist that "the audi-
ence be seen as composed of individuals who could not be manipulated but could only be 
appealed to in terms of their systematic cultural strengths." Mead, supra note 20, at 343. Dr. 
Mead gave an example in the nutrition field: "It would . . . be regarded as ethical to try to 
persuade the American people to drink orange juice as a pleasant and nutritional drink by 
establishing a style of breakfast, a visual preference for oranges, and a moral investment in 
good nutrition, but not by frightening individual mothers into serving orange juice for fear 
that they would lose their children's love, or their standing in the community." Id. at 343. 
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This standard would require careful and delicate judgments on 
the part of the FTC and would not permit regulation of commercial 
appeals simply because bureaucrats-or even the. great majority of 
society-deemed them distasteful or improper. Absent convincing 
scientific proof of harm to viewers, only a forceful expression in law 
of societal values would suffice to invoke the FTC's jurisdiction. The 
Commission's task in determining fairness would not be to divine 
the prevailing mood of the nation, but to apply the nation's own 
carefully weighed and reasoned judgments of fairness expressed in 
its statutes and judicial decisions. The values to be discerned do not 
involve norms or preferences-hedonism versus puritanism, cooper-
ation versus self-reliance, heterosexuality versus homosexuality-but 
involve fundamental societal principles articulated in law. Thus, al-
though a racist advertisement might be tolerated by a majority of the 
population, the fundamental principles of American law declare that 
appeal unfair. Should the Commission attempt to project its own 
values upon the public rather than limit its activity to those areas in 
which societal values have been clearly articulated, Congress and the 
courts could correct it. 
Once the Commission determines that a particular advertisement 
or a series of advertisements are deceptive or unfair, it must fashion 
an appropriate remedy. As the Commission has recognized, 173 much 
of the unfairness, deceptiveness, and controversial nature of product 
advertising lies in its relentless one-sidedness, its failure to reveal in-
formation needed by consumers in making purchasing decisions. 
Consequently, a useful remedy in deception cases has been to re-
quire disclosure of material facts. 174 Some unfair advertising appeals 
may be so patently offensive or harmful that a cease and desist order 
directed toward the noxious commercial is proper.175 
Often no single advertisement is responsible for the unfair im-
pact, which results rather from the reinforcement of a similar perni-
cious message or theme by numerous advertisements.176 In such 
173. See text at note 150 supra. 
174. Where an advertisement materially misleads by silence, the Co=ission may require 
disclosure of material facts. See FTC Statement of Basis and Purpose, Trade Regulation Rule, 
Care Labeling of Textile Wearing Apparel, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,883, 23,889 (1971); Cigarette State-
ment, supra note 143, at 835 I. It is clear that disclosure of material information in a thirty- or 
sixty-second television co=ercial is not always practical. 
175. The Supreme Court upheld this approach to unfairness advertising in FTC v. R.F. 
Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934), discussed in note 168 supra. In addition, see the 
physical injury cases cited in note 168 supra. 
176. See Cigarette Statement, supra note 143, at 8357; Silverstein & Silverstein, supra note 
34, at 73; Note, supra note 34, at 177-78. The FTC has stated that 
[i]n the conventional false and misleading advertisinf- case it is not unusual to consider the 
challenged advertisement apart from the respondent s-and the industry's-total advertis-
ing. This is a satisfactory :procedure where the source of public injury or consumer ex-
ploitation lies essentially within the four comers of the advertisement, m the claims made 
or facts left undisclosed. It is less satisfactory where the cumulative effect of massive and 
long-continued advertising throughout an entire industry, in contrast to the effect of a 
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cases the FTC has the authority to require corrective advertising at 
the advertiser's expense to remedy the lingering effects of unfair or 
misleading practices.177 Where advertising has created a deceptive 
impression, the corrective advertisements can supply the supplemen-
tary information necessary for informed consumer choice. Where 
advertising has had an unfair impact, the corrective advertisements 
can offer complementary, balancing messages to mitigate or cure the 
unfairness. 
Thus far the discussion of the deceptiveness and unfairness prin-
ciples and the remedies available to the Commission has been very 
general. Their application in three illustrative areas of current con-
cern-the environment, sexism, and nutrition-should help clarify 
them as well as demonstrate the role the FTC can play in regulation 
of the content and impact of television commercials. 
Consumers' purchasing decisions, as noted previously, 178 affect 
the environment. Conversely, the environment--or, more precisely, 
consumers' perceptions of it-affects their purchasing decisions. 
Opinion surveys continue to find a high level of public concern over 
environmental and energy problems.179 The frequency of advertise-
ments extolling the environmental beneficence180 and energy effi-
ciency of various products indicates that this concern is reflected in 
consumer purchase decisions. Where advertisers have sought ex-
pressly to exploit this concern, the FTC has held them to a strict 
standard of truthfulness. 181 Many advertisements, however, either 
attempt more subtly to associate environmental values with a partic-
single advertisement or particular advertisements, is itself a source of substantial and un-
justifiable injury to the consuming public. 
Cigarette Statement, supra note 143, at 8357. 
177. See Warner-Lambert Co., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 
21,066, at 20,934-35 (1975), qi.ft/. as mod!fied, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. 
Ct. 1575 (1978); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 464-74 (1972), qffd., 481 F.2d 246 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973); ITT Continental Baking Co., 83 F.T.C. 865, 971-
72, mod!fied, 83 F.T.C. 1105 (1973), enforcement ofmod!fied order granted, 532 F.2d 207 (2d 
Cir. 1976). ,See generally Cornfeld, A New Approach to an Old Remedy: Corrective Advertising 
and the Federal Trade Commission, 61 IOWA L. REv. 693 (1976); Comment, Corrective Adver-
tising-The New Response to Consumer Deception, 72 CoLUM. L. REv. 415 (1972). 
178. See note 28 supra. 
119. See, eg., OPINION RESEARCH CORP., PuBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL 
TRADEOFFS (1975). This study reported that 60% of those surveyed expressed a willingness to 
pay Wgher prices in order to protect the environment and that a 48% plurality preferred Wgher 
automobile prices to eliminating pollution-control devices. 
180. See D. RUBIN & D. SACHS, MAss MEDIA AND THE ENVIRONMENT 114-49 (1973); 
Sandman, supra note 27. 
181. See Standard Oil of Cal., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 
20,789 (1974). In ruling that advertisements claiming extraordinary antipollution qualities for 
a brand of gasoline were deceptive, the FTC stated: 
The challenged . . . aavertisements are examples of the type of advertising whlch 
focuses on serious anxieties of consumers resulting from heated public discussion of issues 
such as environmental protection; individual and public health; job, home, and auto 
safety; economic woes such as shortages and inflation; etc. . . . In our opinion, it is in-
cumbent upon advertisers who seek to advance their own interests in even partial reliance 
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ular product notwithstanding the product's actual adverse environ-
mental impact or are simply silent about the environmental impact 
of the product being promoted. Snowmobile advertisements, for ex-
ample, typically picture carefree enjoyment of the product in pristine 
wilderness settings without making reference to the destructive ef-
fects of snowmobiling on wilderness ecosystems. 182 Similarly, auto-
mobile commercials often present the product against a backdrop of 
idyllic nature-coastal vistas, small farms, grassy fields, and the like; 
the role of the automobile in urban congestion and air pollution is 
understandably ignored. 183 In these circumstances-where advertis-
ing creates impressions material to consumer choice and clearly re-
buttable by reference to appropriate facts-disclosure principles184 
should require that these facts be presented to the viewers. 
Disclosure principles do not require that adve~isers "tell all" 
about their products and business. Rather, they only require a fair 
presentation of facts concerning a particular issue raised by the ad-
vertisement. Automobile commercials with heavy doses of pastoral 
imagery clearly imply that automobiles are clean, pristine machines. 
If that impression influences consumer purchase decisions, disclo-
sure of corrective information is warranted. These corrective adver-
tisements, however, would not have to disclose other facts that might 
influence consumer choice but that are unrelated to issues raised by 
the commercial, such as a problem with a trunk latch reported by 
some owners, a labor dispute involving the manufacturer, or the 
.manufacturer's investments in foreign countries in which human 
rights are allegedly denied. If an advertisement cannot be said to 
open the door to these subjects by its own explicit or implicit repre-
on such serious consumer concerns to exercise an extra measure of caution in order to be 
certain that their representations to consumers will not deceive or mislead. 
Id. at 20,656. 
182. See Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060, 1062 (1st Cir. 1975), See 
also Comment, supra note 103, at 477. 
183. q: Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (FCC required 
to extend to certain gasoline and automobile commercials the fairness doctrine as applied to 
cigarette commercials). 
184. See text at notes 156-59 supra. As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit has stated, "[w]here a controversial issue with potentially grave consequences is left to 
each individual to decide for himself, the need for an abundant and ready supply of relevant 
information is too obvious to need belaboring." Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1089 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). 
Application of disclosure principles in the environmental area would further the con-
gressional policy declared in the Environmental Education Act § l(a), 20 U.S.C. § 153l(a) 
(1970): 
The Con&ress of the United States finds that the deterioration of the quality of the Na-
tion's environment and of its ecological balance poses a serious threat to the strength and 
vitality of the people of the Nation and is in part due to poor understanding of the Na-
tion's environment and of the need for ecolo&ical balance; that presently there do not exist 
adequate resources for educating and informmg citizens in these areas, and that concerted 
efforts in educating citizens about environmental quality and ecological balance are there-
fore necessary. 
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sentations, no disclosure obligation would arise. If, on the other 
hand, the advertisement boasts of "a trouble-free trunk" or "the cor-
poration with a conscience," it might trigger disclosure obliga-
tions.185 Nor does this-standard for disclosure reach the larger social 
issues in a consumer society that are only tangentially raised by a 
particular product advertisement. Implicit endorsements of conspic-
uous consumption, frivolous technology, and novelty for its own 
sake are not factual representations, but social judgments. Conse-
quently, no contrary "facts" exist to be disclosed. 
While commercials that make implicit or explicit deceptive state-
ments about the environmental impact of particular products should 
be subject to disclosure requirements, whether appeals that simply 
foster antienvironmental attitudes can be deemed "unfair" within 
the meaning of section 5 raises a more difficult question. Although 
the nation's policy in favor of environmental quality is manifest, 186 
the details of that policy are the subject of vigorous debate. The 
FTC's authority to protect the consumer from unfair and harmful 
commercial appeals does not permit it to choose among political 
viewpoints. A finding of unfairness should rest only upon a demon-
stration of a controlling national value or of palpable harm of the 
kind suggested in Sperry & Hutchinson. 187 
185. Another example is provide$! by an advertisement for canned tuna. Claims of good 
flavor, nutrition, or convenience do not implicate the question of porpoise mortality associated 
with the commercial tuna industry. Representations that hook-and-line fishing is used to catch 
individual tuna, however, would require disclosure of actual netting techniques and their• dan-
ger to porpoises if porpoise mortality were shown to affect the purchasing choi~s of a substan-
tial number of consumers. 
186. See The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 433l(a) 
(1970): 
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations 
of all components of the natural environment, particularly the profound influences of 
population growth, hi~-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, 
ana new and expanding technological advances and recognizing further the critical im-
portance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and 
oevelopment of man, declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, 
in coo_peration with State and local governments, and other concerned public and private 
organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including financial and techni-
cal assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create 
and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, 
and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations 
of Americans. 
In addition, see Environmental Education Act, § l(a), 20 U.S.C. § 153l(a) (1970), quoted in 
note 184 supra, Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 
(Supp. V 1975); Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970). 
187. See text at notes 165 & 170-71 supra. It may be that the nation is fast approaching the 
formulation of a controlling value favoring energy conservation. See, e.g., Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (Supp. V 1975); N.Y. Times, April 19, 1977, at 24, 
col. I (text of one of President Carter's energy addresses). If such a value develops and is 
manifested in law, the FTC could require corrective advertising or restrict commercial appeals 
encouraging wasteful energy practices because of unfairness to consumers. 
It may be argued persuasively that the pervasive presentation of only one perspec-
tive-the business perspective-of the environmental issue, or of any issue, is itself an unfair 
practice because it is antidemocratic. Interview, supra note 125. However, general arbitration 
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The principle of deceptiveness is particularly suited for applica-
tion to commercials promoting controversial products, such as snow-
mobiles, that frequently do not disclose the information necessary 
for rational consumer decisionmaking with respect to the subject of 
the controversy. Consequently, under this analysis the FTC has au-
thority to remedy a substantial amount of the objectionable impact 
of advertisements for controversial products. It is more difficult to 
establish a basis for the Commission's authority to regulate the im-
pact of advertisements that present only one side of an important 
issue in a context other than the promotion of a controversial prod-
uct. 188 FTC action in such cases would be limited to the exercise of 
its authority under the unfairness doctrine. Advertisements employ-
ing sex-role stereotyping provide an illustration of the potential ap-
plication of this doctrine. 
Emerging national values and accumulating evidence of harm 
converge to suggest that, under the Sperry & Hutchinson test, perva-
'sive sex-role stereotyping in television advertising is unfair to view-
ers. Numerous statutes and court decisions evince a national policy 
against this stereotyping where it results in invidious discrimination 
against women.189 Moreover, pervasive media stereotyping reduces 
freedom of choice for both sexes and may adversely affect the 
mental health of viewers. 190 Although women and men alike may 
disagree on the propriety of special benefits and protections to be 
afforded women, the principles of equal opportunity and freedom of 
choice seem so clearly approved in American law that the FTC may 
take effective action against sex-role stereotyping without having to 
choose among several seriously competing political viewpoints. 
Remedial action to counter sex-role stereotyping in television 
commercials might take one or both of two forms. The first would 
require advertisers to promote freedom of choice in sex roles through 
their regular product advertising, such as by representing more wo-
men in professional roles and more men performing household 
chores. The second alternative, corrective advertising, would explic-
itly promote freedom of choice in sex roles through advertisements 
similar to the "anti-cigarette" messages used to discourage smok-
ing.191 Given that the problem of stereotyping arises not from any 
of demands for television access to reply to the social and political bias of advertising exceeds 
the essentially co=ercial jurisdiction of the FTC. The solution of this broader problem rests 
with the Federal Co=unications Commission and with Congress. 
188. An advertisement promoting a controversial product may pose the same difficulty if 
the controversial nature of the product is unrelated to the important issue presented in an 
unfair manner. An example is an advertisement employing sex-role stereotyping in the promo-
tion of an automobile. 
189. See the statutes and cases cited and discussed in Note, supra note 34, at 171-75. 
190. See text at notes 36-39 supra. 
191. Because responsibility for sex-role stereotyping in television commercials is widely 
shared, fmancing the corrective advertising poses practical problems. Perhaps the most equita• 
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particular advertising theme or practice but from the similar content 
of many advertisements, 192 these counter-advertisements might be 
the better remedy. Despite the FTC's apparent authority and the 
remedies available, the Commission has taken no action with respect 
to sex-role stereotyping in product commercials. 
Food advertising on television presents the strongest case for vig-
orous Commission action under both disclosure and unfairness prin-
ciples. It is also an area in which the Commission has already been 
relatively active, thus far with unimpressive results. The Commission 
staff has negotiated consent orders proscribing false or deceptive nu-
tritional claims. 193 When hearing contested staff complaints, how-
ever, the Commission has been reluctant to find misrepresentation 
by implication or innuendo.194 Although the Commission has pro-
ble solution would be to assess television advertisers collectively for the cost of corrective 
messages, excepting those advertisers who could demonstrate to the FTC's satisfaction that 
their advertising generally does not represent stereotyped sex roles. 
192. See note 176 supra. 
193. See, e.g., Carnation Co., (1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 
20,566 (1974) (representation of a chocolate drink as the nutritional equivalent of milk); Am-
star Corp., (1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 20,356 (1973) (claim that 
sugar is a unique source of energy, strength, and stamina); Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 
[1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ~ 19,981 (1972) (claim that cranberry juice is 
more nutritious than alternative breakfast juices). All three consent orders required disclosures 
or corrective advertising. 
194. Coca-Cola Co., 83 F.T.C. 746 (1973), involved a classic case of nutritional counter-
education by television advertising. See text at notes 42-46 supra. The complaint alleged, inter 
alia, that advertising for Hi-C fruit drinks misrepresented the product as (I) "'The Sensible 
Drink,' nutritionally and economically, as a source of vitamin C,'' (2) "made with fresh fruit 
and [having] a high fruit content comparable to fresh fruits and fruit juices,'' (3) "unqualifiedly 
good for children,'' and (4) "particularly high in vitamin C content even as compared to ... 
citrus fruit juices." 83 F.T.C. at 751. 
In affirming the initial decision of the administrative law judge dismissing the com-
plaint, the FTC found that ''the advertising representations made in behalf of Hi-C are not 
reasonably likely to have communicated the comparisons and claims of equivalence to citrus 
juices •.. so critical to the allegations advanced by complaint counsel" 83 F.T.C. at 818. The 
FTC also ruled that the express claims that the product was "made from fresh fruit" and 
"made with real fruit" did not suggest 
that Hi-C is made with fresh fruit, in the specific sense that unprocessed fruit was used in 
the manufacturing process. . . . [C]onsumers would not be reasonably likely to take this 
meaning from these words. The claims are true in the sense that the fruit components of 
the product are made from fresh fruit rather than from artificial or synthetic ingredients, 
and consumers are likely to so interpret the representation, based upon their unoerstand-
ing of canned unrefrigerated fruit drinks. 
83 F.T.C. at 812 (footnotes omitted). Commissioner Jones dissented: 
The Hi-C commercials are, in my view, a classic exam_ple of a message conveyed by 
words, ambiance and picturization using suggestion, ambiguous comparison and subtle 
innuendo .•.. 
The Commission's opinion ignores or perhaps reverses the standard model of the con-
sumer as ''the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous consumer" which the Commis-
sion has been commended to use in determining whether a J>articular act or J>ractice is 
unfair or deceptive. (Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d f65, 167 (7th Cir. 1942)) lnsteaa, without 
any record evidence to support it the Commission implicitly adof>ts a new consumer 
model . . • portraying the consumer as discriminating, sophisticateo and hij;hly knowl-
edgeable as well as skeptical and unbelieving. This consumer knows that fruit drinks are 
not the same as citrus Juices despite what Hi-C's ads said. 
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posed a trade regulation rule setting forth disclosure standards for 
food advertising, that rule would require nutritional information 
only to substantiate express nutritional claims. 195 Only with its re-
cent proposals concerning children's television advertising has the 
Commission begun to recognize the potentially unfair and mislead-
ing effects of food commercials.196 
Even though it has utilized affirmative disclosure as an appropri-
ate remedy for silence that misleads, the Com.mission once stated 
with regard to broadcast food advertising that "it would be unrealis-
tic to impose upon the advertiser the heavy burden of nutrition edu-
cation."197 Unfortunately for the consumer, the food industry is 
already conducting a massive campaign of "nutrition education" 
designed solely to induce the purchase of its highly processed, rela-
83 F.T.C. at 802-06 (emphasis original). 
ITT Continental Baking Co., Inc., 83 F.T.C. 865, mod!fted, 83 F.T.C. I 105 (1973), enforce-
ment of order as mod!fted granted, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976), concerned major television, 
radio, and print advertising campaigns for Wonder Bread and Hostess snack cakes. The cam-
pi:igns were aimed primarily at children aged one through twelve and their mothers. 83 F.T.C. 
at 950. The Wonder Bread television advertisements stressed the product's significant contri-
bution to rapid growth and typically contained time-sequence photography depicting a child 
rapidly growing taller and larger. The announcer stated that a child would "never need Won-
der Bread more than right now, because the time to grow bigger and stronger is during the 
Wonder Years-ages one through twelve-the years when your child grows to ninety percent 
of his adult height .... How can you help? By serving nutritious Wonder Enriched Bread. 
Wonder helps build strong bodies twelve ways. Each delicious slice of Wonder Bread supplies 
protein ... minerals ... carbohydrates ... vitamins .... " 83 F.T.C. at 867. The Hostess 
advertisements stated that vitamin-enriched Hostess snack cakes provide "good nutrition" and 
implied that the cakes represent a "major nutritional advance." 83 F.T.C. at 872-73. 
The FTC staff complaint alleged, inter alia, that the Wonder Bread advertisements were 
deceptive because the product is "not an outstanding source of nutrients," will not provide a 
child ''with all the nutrients, in recommended quantities, that are essential to healthy growth 
and development," and is not "an extraordinary food for producing dramatic growth in chil-
dren." 83 F.T.C. at 870-72. The Hostess advertisements were said to be deceptive because 
vitamin-enrichment was not a major nutritional advance because the snack cakes, made pri-
marily of sugar, provided significant quantities of only three of ten essential vitamins. 83 
F.T.C. at 873-74. 
The FTC dismissed all allegations but one: it held that the Wonder Bread advertisements 
falsely represented the product as having extraordinary growth-inducing qualities. 83 F.T.C. at 
962. It found it "impossible to imply from these [Wonder Bread] commercials the very specific 
representations" further alleged, 83 F.T.C. at 958, and found corrective advertising unwar-
ranted. 83 F.T.C. at 972. The Hostess advertisements were not deceptive, the FTC concluded, 
because vitamin-enriched snack cakes represented a genuine "major nutritional advance" rela-
tive to nonenriched snack cakes, because the "good nutrition" claim was implicitly qualified to 
mean only vitamin enrichment, and because "housewives are well aware, as a matter of com-
mon knowledge and experience, that snack cakes, whether home-made or commercially manu-
factured, do contain large amounts of sugar." 83 F.T.C. at 964-66. Commissioner Jones 
dissented with regard to several of these conclusions. 83 F.T.C. at 943-47. 
195. See Proposed Trade Regulation Rule, 39 Fed. Reg. 39,842 (1974). But see the FTC 
staff proposal contained in FTC Staff Statement of Fact, Law, and Policy in Support of the 
Proposed Rule and in Support of Affirmative Disclosures in Food Advertising, 39 Fed. Reg. 
39,852 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Disclosure Statement], discussed in note 200 iefra. 
196. See notes 2 & 168 supra. 
197. ITT Continental Baking Co., 83 FTC 865, 965, mod!fted, 83 F.T.C. 1105 (1973), en-
forcement of order as mod!fted granted, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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tively unnutritious products.198 The law of deceptive advertising re-
quires that material facts be disclosed where silence misleads. 199 
Nothing could be more material to the purchase of food products 
than their nutritional qualities. For generations, people have as-
sumed that food feeds-that it has nutritional value sufficient to 
meet human needs. Where that assumption no longer holds, adver-
tisers have a responsibility to disclose the facts.200 
Moreover, the significance of television advertising in shaping 
viewers' perceptions of food values201 creates a further responsibility 
to educate viewers about good nutrition. That so powerful an educa-
tional tool should be used to encourage unhealthful eating habits in 
a malnourished nation202 is the most offensive and harmful form of 
unfairness. 203 As part of the price of access to television, food adver-
tisers should be assessed the cost of corrective nutritional messages, 
both informational and motivational.204 
198. See text at notes 40-45 supra. 
199. See note 174 supra. 
200. Former FDA Commissioner Alexander M. Schmidt has pointed out that "[t]he in-
creasing number of processed and formulated foods makes it difficult for consumers to iden-
tify the nutritional qualities of the products they purchase." Address ( The Role of the FJ)A in 
Food Sefety) of Commissioner Schmidt to the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science Symposium on Food Safety and the Organic Food Myth (San Francisco, California, 
Feb. 25, 1974), quoted in 39 Fed. Reg. 39,854 (1974). See generally J. TURNER, THE CHEMICAL 
FEAST (1970). An FDA study found that 40% of shoppers nationwide believed that the govern-
ment currently insures that processed foods are nutritious and "good for you." PUBLIC 
HEALTH SERVICE, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION 
AND WELFARE, FDA CONSUMER KNOWLEDGE SURVEY, REPORT I, 1973-74, at 39 (HEW 
(FDA) Pub. No. 76-2058, 1976). 
The FTC staff has proposed certain affirmative disclosure requirements for all food 
advertising, regardless of express claims. See Disclosure Statement, supra note 195. Because 
this proposal was not endorsed by the FTC, the Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion, or the Assistant Director for National Advertising, its prospects for adoption appear re-
mote. The staff set forth four reasons why standards of deceptiveness should apply "with 
particular strictness" to food advertising: (I) that advertising's major impact on consumers' 
health; (2) its regressive economic impact on the poor; (3) its frequent direction at "especially 
vulnerable audiences-children, the poor, the elderly"; and (4) the "special duty of fair dealing 
towards consumers" arising from the "power'' and ''tremendous influence" of the food indus-
try's "massive and forceful advertising." Id. at 39,856 (citing Cigarette Statement, supra note 
143, at 9357, quoted in text at note 143 supra). 
201. See note 44 supra. 
202. See note 38 supra. 
203. The nation's commitment to the proper nourishment of its people is reflected in nu-
merous congressional enactments. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976) (food stamp program); 42 
U.S.C. § 3045 (Supp. V 1975) (nutrition programs for the elderly). 
204. The Panel on Popular Education and How To Reach Disadvantaged Groups of the 
White House Conference on Food Nutrition and Health stated in its formal recommendations 
that 
[i]t is impossible for the American people to obtain proper nutrition education without the 
planned availability of the mass media of public information-radio and television. 
Nutrition education ... cannot be cast in a beggar's role with radio and television 
stations for air time which is the people's property to begin with. 
Any nutrition program must have the assurance that it will have at least as much 
exposure to the people through their mass media as is received by any selling effort in 
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It is perhaps unrealistic to expect the Federal Trade Commission 
to respond to the problem of the social impact of television product 
advertising more aggressively or innovatively than has the Federal 
Communications Commission.205 The purpose of this Note is not to 
predict bureaucratic behavior, but to set forth the legal basis for 
meaningful action. In light of several recent Supreme Court deci-
sions redefining the scope of constitutional protection accorded com-
mercial speech,206 any proposal for the regulation of television 
advertising, whether proscriptive or prescriptive, must be evaluated 
against first amendment standards. It is to that concern that this 
Note now turns. 
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND TELEVISION ADVERTISING 
The first amendment represents a commitment to free and open 
discussion of competing ideas-a commitment based upon the con-
victions that the freedom to say what one pleases is sacrosanct, that 
truth will emerge fortified from the cacophony, and that regulation 
of speech invites tyranny.207 Traditionally, a distinction has been 
drawn between "commercial" and "noncommercial" speech for pur-
behalf of major cigarette brands, automobiles, or airlines or other major consumer prod-
uct selling efforts. 
Final Report, supra note 45, at 182-83. The Panel recommended that radio and television 
licensees be required to set aside 10% of broadcast time for "public service communications 
programs of the Federal Government." Id. at 183. The Panel evidently envisioned a 
mandatory nutrition education program under the "public interest" standard of the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934, § 303, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970), the cost of which would be borne 
by the licensees rather than by food advertisers. In a similar vein, the staff of the U.S. Senate 
Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs has generally recommended "extensive use 
of television to educate the public in the potential benefits of following certain dietary goals," 
DIETARY GOALS, supra note 40, at 84. 
A recent study suggests that the mass media have considerable potential for achieving 
changes in health-related behavior. An educational campaign in a California town using tele• 
vision and radio spot advertisements, "mini-dramas," and other media resulted in a substantial 
reduction in egg consumption and cigarette smoking as compared to a control community, 
Maccoby & Farquhar, Communication for Health: Unselling Hearl JJisease, J. COM,, Summer 
1975, at 114, 119-20, 122-23. 
205. See generally E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, THE NADER REPORT ON THE FED· 
ERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969). Nevertheless, the FTC's discussions suggest the potential for 
bold action in the national advertising field, even where substantial economic interests are at 
stake. See Cigarette Statement, supra note 143. Moreover, during his confirmation hearings, 
Michael Pertschuk expressed concern about the social impacts of advertising, particularly ad-
vertising that "revels in waste" of energy and other resources and food advertising that may be 
"in part responsible for conditioning a nation of sugar junkies." N.Y. Times, March 31, 1977, 
at § D, at 9, col. 2. The FTC's recent initiatives concerning children's television advertising 
may signal a new, more activist approach. See notes 2 & 168 supra. See also Brown, TV Edgy 
over Refarmers and the F.CC and F.T.C, N.Y. Times, March 22, 1978, § A, at I, col, 5, 
206. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Carey v. Population Services 
Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 
(1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748 (1976), 
207. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1975), and cases cited therein. 
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poses of first amendment analysis.208 Although recent pronounce-
ments of the Supreme Court continue to recognize some distinction, 
they preclude the mechanical exclusion of advertising from first 
amendment protection merely by a resort to labeling.209 Moreover, a 
central premise of this Note has been that product advertising plays 
a significant role in shaping cultural and political perceptions, which 
suggests that it may be precisely the kind of speech most deserving of 
first amendment protection. However, careful analysis of the ration-
ales of the recent decisions extending the constitutional protection to 
"commercial speech" indicates that the regulatory approaches pro-
posed by this Note are constitutionally permissible. 
In 1942, in a ruling later described by one of the participating 
Justices as "casual, almost offhand,"210 the Supreme Court held that 
first amendment protections do not extend to "purely commercial 
advertising."211 The Court has forcefully repudiated this absolute 
view in a rash of decisions in the past three years. In Bigelow v. 
Virginia,212 the Court struck down a Virginia statute barring adver-
tisement of abortion services, declaring that the "relationship of 
speech to the marketplace of products or of services does not make it 
valueless in the marketplace of ideas."213 The opinion stressed that 
the advertisements at issue "contained factual matter of clear 'public 
interest.' "214 Next, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,215 the Court, although acknowledg-
ing that certain commercial advertisements may have special public 
interest aspects that leave them open to governmental regulation, 
overturned the state's prohibition of price advertising of prescription 
drugs on the additional ground that the "free flow of commercial 
information" is itself in the public interest and constitutionally pro-
tected. 216 
208. See Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. Christensen, 316 
u:s. 52 (1942). 
209. One commentator recently proposed that all ''profit-oriented" speech be deemed be-
yond the first amendment's purview because such speech does not involve the individual vi-
sion or values that lie at the heart of the freedom of expression. Balcer, Commercial Speech: A 
.Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 lowA L. REV. I (1976). 
210. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
211. Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). 
212. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
213. 421 U.S. at 822. Indeed, the Court noted that the services offered were constitution-
ally protected. 421 U.S. at 822 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 
410 U.S. 179 (1973)). . 
214. 421 U.S. at 822. 
215. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
216. 425 U.S. at 764-65, 770. The Court stated that 
[a]dvertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dis-
semination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what 
reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise econ-
omy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made throu~ numerous 
private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those dec1Sions, in the 
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In the three most recent commercial speech cases, the Court has 
reiterated the public's interest in the free flow of commercial mes-
sages. In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,217 a 
unanimous Court held real estate "for sale" signs constitutionally in-
distinguishable from the advertisements in Bigelow and Virginia 
Pharmacy and thus struck down a municipal ordinance banning the 
signs' display. The majority opinion in Carey v. Population Services 
International,218 relying upon both the "free flow of commercial in-
formation" rationale of Virginia Pharmacy and the special con-
siderations that arise when commercial information relates to 
"activity with which, at least in some respects, the State cannot inter-
fere,"219 held unconstitutional a statutory ban on advertisements for 
contraceptive products. Finally, a five-member majority in Bates v. 
State Bar of Arizona,220 held that blanket suppression of advertising 
by attorneys violates the first amendment. 
In concluding that commercial speech enjoys constitutional pro-
tection, the Court has explicitly recognized that such speech is not 
"wholly undifferentiable from other forms"221 and that the differ-
ences "suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to 
insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial inf orma-
tion is unimpaired."222 Although the Court has suggested a few 
standards appropriate to commercial speech,223 it has not yet been 
required to delineate the precise boundaries of the "degree of protec-
tion" to be accorded product advertising. Nonetheless, the principles 
expressed by the Court provide at least a tentative basis for evaluat-
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of co=ercial in-
formation is indispensable. [Citations omitted.] And if it is indispensable to the proper 
allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the format10n 
of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, 
even if the First Amendment were thought to l,e primarily an instrument to enlighten 
public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information 
ooes not serve that goal. 
425 U.S. at 765. 
217. 431 U.S. 85 (1977). 
218. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
219. 425 U.S. at 760. Cf. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (first amendment protec-
tion of a message is not necessarily negated because the message has co=ercial aspects), 
220. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
221. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. 
222. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 381; Carey, 431 U.S. at 716-17 (Stevens, 
J., concurring); Linmark, 431 U.S. at 96. 
223. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. The Court stated that the attribute of com-
mercial speech-that is, that it may be more readily verifiable by the speaker and less likely to 
be chilled than nonco=ercial speech-
may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the 
speaker. . . • They may also make it appropriate to require that a co=ercial message 
appear in such a form or include such aooitional information, warnings, and disclaimers, 
as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive. . . . They may also malce inapplicable the 
prohibition against prior restraints. 
425 U.S. at 771 n.24. 
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ing the constitutionality of the regulatory approach to television 
product advertising suggested by this Note. 
Although the issue has not been directly before it, the Court has 
stated that the protection accorded commercial speech presents no 
obstacle to regulating false, misleading, or deceptive advertising to 
ensure "that the stream of commercial information flow[s] cleanly as 
well as freely."224 Such restrictions are consistent with, if not man-
dated by, the Court's rationale for extending first amendment pro-
tection to commercial speech. At the heart of the recent decisions lies 
the right of the citizen to receive truthful and reliable information, 225 
a right protected by regulations prohibiting false, misleading, and 
deceptive advertising.226 In addition, the economic motivation of 
commercial speech makes it "durable" enough not to be inhibited by 
strict proscription of inaccuracy. 227 
Regulation of "unfair," as distinct from "deceptive," appeals has 
been so little exercised that courts have yet to consider its constitu-
tional limits. The principles enunciated in the recent commercial 
speech decisions suggest that the kinds of advertisements identified 
as "unfair" by this Note carry no greater first amendment protection 
than do deceptive advertisements. As indicated in section III, unfair-
ness principles give the Commission authority to regulate that por-
tion of a product commercial that conveys implicit messages clearly 
harmful in light of fundamental public values.228 
The Supreme Court has extended constitutional protection to 
commercial speech in order to protect the public's right to accurate 
product information. But advertisements that are arguably unfair are 
rarely informative.229 O~ten they are designed to becloud the rational 
faculties of the viewer in order to induce purchase not of a product, 
but of an image. 230 The implicit association of profligate energy use 
224. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84; Car"1, 431 
U.S. at 701; 431 U.S. at 716 (Stevens, J., concurring); Linmark, 431 U.S. at 98. . 
225. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 383. q: Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Com-
mercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 432-34 (1971) 
(advertising informs consumers of what is offered for sale and provides information which 
permits a rational choice among competing products). 
226. Differences may exist with respect to what constitutes misleading or deceptive adver-
tising. For example, in Bates, the Supreme Court was divided on whether the particular adver-
tisement in question was deceptive and whether price advertising by attorneys is inherently 
deceptive. Compare the majority opinion, 433 U.S. at 372-75, 381-83, with 433 U.S. at 386-88 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting), and 433 U.S. at 391-95 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
227. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24. Extrinsic factors material to consumer deci-
;ions have traditionally been covered by the law of deceptive advertising, see text at note 154 
supra, and recent decisions of the Supreme Court give no reason to believe that such misrepre-
;entations are now protected. 
228. See text at notes 153-77 supra. 
229. For example, the verbal content of the cigar advertisement described in note 213 
rupra consists entirely of a musical jingle and the word "Muriel'' flashed briefly on the screen. 
230. See .Developments, supra note 135, at 1010. Historian David Potter pointed out that 
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with high social status, for example, conveys nothing about the qual-
ity of the product. In other instances unfair advertising content is not 
only irrelevant to the product, but also to the advertising appeal. The 
casual but consistent stereotyping of women in advertisements may 
often be wholly incidental to the advertiser's purpose. Application of 
the unfairness doctrine thus leaves the protected information content 
of the commercial speech untouched; by restricting advertising's an-
tirational or irrelevant content, the doctrine serves to highlight inf or-
mation. 231 
Properly considered, the regulation of unfairness assesses impact, 
not content-it does not restrict dissemination of commercial inf or-
mation, but encourages it. It seeks to prevent the offensive and detri-
mental impact that may be a consequence of the noninf ormational 
content of television product advertising. The Supreme Court has 
stated, however, that the possible offensiveness or detrimental im-
pact of a particular commercial message does not justify its suppres-
sion. In Carey the Court refused to uphold a statutory ban on the 
advertisement of contraceptive products despite the argument that 
such advertisements would be offensive and embarrassing to those 
exposed to them.232 And in Linmark the Court stated that "[a]fter 
Virginia Pharmacy it is clear that commercial speech cannot be 
banned because of an unsubstantiated belief that its impact is 'detri-
mental.' "233 It is important to note, however, that these recent 
"advertising tends to minimize information and maximize appeal, with the result that produc-
ers tend less to differentiate their products physically, in terms of quality, or economically, in 
terms of price, than to differentiate them psychologically in terms of slogan, package, or pres-
tige." Thus, Potter concluded, "advertising tends less to provide the consumer with what he 
wants than to make him like what he gets." D. POTIER, supra note 26, at 187-88. 
A recent advertisement for Good Housekeeping in Advertising Age nicely illustrates the 
manipulative, rather than informative, function of modem advertising. Directed at advertisers 
themselves, the advertisement quoted from Emerson: "Build a better mousetrap and the world 
will beat a path to your door." The ad copy noted that, in today's skeptical world, a superior 
product is insufficient persuasion; a credible advertising medium is essential. "So if you've got 
the mousetrap-we've got the cheese." Advertising Age, Oct. 25, 1976, at 27. The advertise-
ment indicated no sense of irony in having transformed Emerson's consumer from a mouse-
trap pur~haser into a mouse being trapped by the product. 
231. Cf. Redish, supra note 225, at 446. 
232. The Court stated that "(a]t least where obscenity is not involved, we have consistently 
held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppres-
sion." 431 U.S. at 701 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)). Cf. Virginia Pharmacy, 
425 U.S. at 765 (1976) (asserting that much advertising is "tasteless and excessive" and proba-
bly offends many). 
In his concurring opinion in Carey, Justice Stevens emphasized that the Court's opinion 
did not "deprive the State of all power to regulate ... advertising in order to minimize its 
offensiveness." 431 U.S. at 717. In addition, see Justice Powell's concurring opinion, 431 U.S. 
at 711-12. 
233. 431 U.S. at 92 n.6. The Court was not required to decide whether commercial speech 
could be banned when the likelihood of detrimental impact had been substantiated because 
the Court held that the defendant municipality failed to establish that the proscription of "for 
sale" signs would "reduce public awareness of realty sales and thereby decrease public concern 
over selling." 431 U.S. at 95-96. 
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Supreme Court cases concerned restrictions designed to prevent ad-
vertising impact attributable precisely to the protected informational 
content of the advertisements. The Township of Willingboro sought 
to ban "for sale" signs because it feared the result of public knowl-
edge of the seller's offer to sell. If the contraceptive advertisements in 
Carey were offensive and embarrassing to some persons, the nature 
of the advertised product was the cause. The advertising messages 
that would be regulated by the unfairness doctrine, in contrast, are 
entirely incidental to the protected commercial information.234 Reg-
ulation of unfair advertising responds not to the fact of the commer-
cial appeal, but to its manner. With regard to the commercial 
information protected by the Constitution, regulation of incidental 
messages implicit in the advertisement is no more than a "time, 
place, or manner" restriction of the kind expressly reaffirmed in 
Linmark. 
Judicial recognition of the unique qualities of television broad-
casting also suggests that special regulatory measures will survive 
constitutional scrutiny. Citing only Capital Broadcasting Co. v. 
Mitchell,235 the Court expressly reserved judgment in Virginia 
Pharmacy on the constitutionality of advertising regulation involv-
ing "the special problems of the electronic broadcast media."236 At 
first glance that citation is puzzling, because Capital Broadcasting 
upheld not merely the regulation of broadcast advertising, but an 
outright statutory ban on broadcast advertising of a particular prod-
uct, cigarettes.237 Since the Court struck down similar suppressions of 
particular commercial information in Virginia Pharmacy and its 
Although evidence exists of the impact on viewers of unfair appeals, see text at notes 
11-47 supra, that evidence may not sufficiently prove adverse impact. Nonetheless, regulation 
of unfair appeals would not be constitutionally prohibited because, unlike the situation in 
Linmark, the restriction would not be a total ban and, more important, the regulated portion 
of the message-the portion having the detrimental impact-would contain no commercial 
information. Thus, the adverse impact could be avoided without affecting the protected com-
mercial content of the speech. 
234. This is not to say that the messages contained in such appeals can never be protected 
by the first amendment. This Note asserts that these appeals are not constitutionally protected 
when implicitly made in the context of a product commercial. On the other hand, messages 
expressly discussed in this context are afforded complete first amendment protection. Of 
course, if the message were expressly conveyed in the broadcast media and concerned an issue 
of public controversy, fairness doctrine obligations would arise. See note 249 infra. 
235. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), o/.fd mem. sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. · 
Acting Atty. Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972), cited in Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773. 
236. 425 U.S. at 773. In addition, see Bates, 433 U.S. at 384 (''the special problems of 
advertising on the electronic broadcast media will warrant special consideration"); Carey, 431 
U.S. at 712 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring) ("carefully tailored restrictions may be especially ap-
propriate when advertising is accomplished by means of the electronic media"); Bigelow, 42 l 
U.S. at 825 n.10 ("[we) need [not) comment on the First Amendment ramifications oflegisla-
tive prohibitions of certain kinds of advertising in the electronic media"). 
237. The statutory ban reviewed in Capital Broadcasting is contained in the Public Health 
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976). 
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other commercial speech decisions, Capital Broadcastings apparent 
continuing authority must lie in its distinctive treatment of the 
broadcast media.238 In distinguishing broadcasting from the print 
media, Judge Gasch, writing for a majority of the three-judge district 
court in Capital Broadcasting, relied principally upon Banzhaf v. 
FCC,239 which had upheld application of the fairness doctrine to cig-
arette commercials prior to their expulsion from the airwaves. In his 
discussion of what he called "the significant differences between the 
electronic media and print,240 Judge Gasch quoted an observation of 
the Banzhaf Court: 
Written messages are not communicated unless they are read, and 
reading requires an affirmative act. Broadcasting messages, in contrast, 
are "in the air." In an age of omnipresent radio, there scarcely breathes 
a citizen who does not know some part of a leading cigarette jingle by 
heart. Similarly, an ordinary habitual television watcher can avoid 
these commercials only by frequently leaving the room, changing the 
channel, or doing some other such affirmative act. It is difficult to cal-
culate the subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda, which may 
be heard even if not listened to, but it may reasonably be thought 
greater than that of the written word.241 
This passage recognizes the pervasive impact of the broadcast me-
dia-the characteristic that is responsible for the unfairness of televi-
sion advertising and that makes its regulation necessary. This power 
is clearly one of the "special problems" posed by broadcasting in the 
context of the first amendment. 242 
Although both Banzhaf and Capital Broadcasting recognized the 
impact of television advertising, they concluded that product adver-
tising enjoyed little, if any, constitutional protection.243 Even though 
238. The Capital Broadcasting opinion also relied on the theory that the petitioner-broad-
casters in the case lost ability to collect revenues but had not lost the right to speak. This theory 
is less significant as an explanation of the citation of the case in Virginia Pharma9'because the 
pharmacies sustained no economic benefit in the form of fees from not posting drug prices, 
239. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). 
240. 333 F. Supp. at 586. 
241. 333 F. Supp. at 586 (quoting 405 F.2d at 1100-01) (omitting fourth sentence of origi-
nal quotation). 
242. The more traditional rationale for the different first amendment protection accorded 
the broadcast media has been the doctrine of "scarcity" and the consequent public "owner-
ship" of the airwaves. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). In his 
dissent in Capital Broadcasting, Judge Wright apparently rejected the notion that the power of 
broadcasting justifies less stringent first amendment protection. He argued that the greater 
government regulation of broadcasting "is constitutionally justified only because it serves to 
apportion access to the media fairly." 333 F. Supp. at 590. 
243. The Capital Broadcasting and Banzhqf courts considered not only the power of 
broadcast advertising, but also its legitimacy as "speech" in the constitutional scheme of free-
dom of expression. Although Banzhqffound that cigarette advertising implicitly raised contro-
versial issues and thus deserved fairness doctrine reply, it also held that such advertising did 
not deserve first amendment protection. Because the advertisements "present[ed] no informa-
tion or arguments ... which might contribute to public debate," the court held that they were 
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this conclusion cannot survive the recent Supreme Court pronounce-
ments, the two decisions are still particularly important for their con-
firmation of the critical distinction-entirely missed in the FCC's 
Fairness Report244-between a message's impact and its value in 
reasoned social discourse. Except for the little product information it 
provides and the express social statement it virtually never makes, 
television product advertising operates outside the realm of rational 
discourse.245 Its influence through innuendo and stereotype avoids 
the defenses of conscious resistance or rebuttal. 246 Although the 
product information and any express social statement contained in it 
are protected by the first amendment, the predominating nonrational 
content is constitutionally regulable.247 
"at best a negligible 'part of the exposition of ideas, and [were] of ... slight social value as a 
step to truth.'" 405 F.2d at 1102 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 
(1942); the Chaplinsky "exposition of ideas" test of first amendment value in speech was reaf-
firmed in Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762). The advertisements were therefore "outside the 
pale of First Amendment concern." 405 F.2d at 1101. 
The Capital Broadcasting court agreed with this reasoning, indicating that fairness doc-
trine obligations simply reflect "the rather limited extent to which product advertising is tan-
gentially regarded as having some limited indicia of [first amendment] protection." 333 F. 
Supp. at 585. 
244. See text at notes 74-76, 91-94 supra. q: Ervin, Advertising: Stepchild of the First 
Amendment, Advertising Age, April 19, 1976, at 122, col. I; Simmons, supra note 59, at 1109. 
245. Gerald J. Thain, then-Assistant Director for Food and Drug Advertising of the FTC's 
Bureau of Consumer Protection, has explained that 
[t]elevision advertising can combine visual, verbal, and emotional stimuli to provide what 
is essentially a nonrational experience for the viewer. A "mood" may be induced, by 
color, music, and camera technigues, which is capable of overcoming rational considera-
tions, such as the price of a standardized product. Mood advertising may associate a prod-
uct with strongly-=held social values sucli as affluence or sophistication, or it may imply 
benefits leading toward the satisfaction of basic emotional needs, such as attractiveness to 
the opposite sex, freedom from fear, and acceptance. In neither situation is there any 
rationa1 connection between the product and the inference being made, and in neither 
case does the advertisement provide sufficient information on the product's real attributes, 
such as quality and price-information conducive to a rational purchase. 
Thain, supra note 167, at 622. See also P. SANDMAN, supra note 15, at 11; Krugman, The 
Impact of Television Advertising: Leaming Without Involvement, 29 Pua. OPINION Q. 349, 354 
(1965). 
246. See note 21 supra. 
247. The Virginia Pharmacy Court stated that the standard governing the application of 
the first amendment is whether particular speech 
is so removed from any "exposition of ideas," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 572 (1942), and from " 'truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of 
liberal sentiments on the administration of Government,'" Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476, 484 (1957), that it lacks all protection. 
425 U.S. at 762. Applying the standard to commercial speech as a class, the Court held that it 
deserved some protection. The application of the standard to the noninformational content of 
television product advertising, however, suggests a contrary result. See Banzhef, 405 F.2d at 
1102, discussed in note 243 supra, note 245 supra. 
The rationale for the regulation of the nonrational content of television commercial adver-
tising is essentially the same rationale that has dictated the regulation of "subliminal" advertis-
ing, in which a message is flashed on a screen so briefly that it is consciously unnoticed but 
subconsciously communicated. The FCC has emphasized that this practice will not be toler-
ated. See 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 50,198 (1974). The Commission suggested that such 
messages are intended to be "deceptive" and noted that the NAB Television Code prohibits 
use of "[a]ny technique whereby an attempt is made to convey info~ation to the viewer by 
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It is ti:ue that a great deal of protected communication contains 
nonrational elements.248 The crowd-pleasing speech, the spot adver-
tisement for a political candidate, and the ordinary motion picture 
all appeal to the intuitive, emotional, and subconscious faculties of 
their audiences. But, in each of these examples, the nonrational 
messages conveyed are primary and direct: the speaker usually in-
tends to convey them and the listener is usually aware of their pres-
ence, which allows him to guard against them. Indeed, except in the 
case of the political advertisement, the listener has actively solicited 
the communication for the specific purpose of enjoying its influ-
ences, rational or otherwise. In contrast, the unfair messages of tele-
vision product advertising are, fo.r both speaker and listener, purely 
ancillary to the primary message of promoting the sale of the prod-
uct.249 The advertiser does not expressly state the unfair messages 
and may not even be aware of them; the audience did not solicit 
them and has no defense against them.250 They are not commercial 
speech-they are not speech. 
An advertiser may expressly discuss an issue of public contro-
versy in the course of a commercial message, and there would then 
be little doubt of its protected status.251 The advertiser could argue 
that snowmobiling is safer and more energy efficient than other rec-
reation, that women find their deepest fulfillment in housework, or 
that sugar is an invaluable nutrient. But the viewer could then con-
sciously weigh the merits of these explicit arguments with a critical 
eye. The viewer, indeed, would also have the benefit of opposing 
views presented under the fairness doctrine, even as presently ad-
transmitting messages below the threshold of normal awareness." Id at 55,370. Subliminal 
advertising raises no first amendment issue not because the subliminal message is not influen-
tial, but because it operates extra-rationally-that is, the inability of the recipient to perceive 
consciously a subliminal message renders it dangerous. See Note, Freedom of Expression in a 
Commercial Context, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1191, 1202 (1965). The unfair appeals and social mod-
els of television product advertising, as the Banzhof and Capital Broadcasting courts under-
stood, are no more deserving of constitutional protection. 
248. See Note, supra note 247, at 1202. 
249. In some instances, of course, the advertiser may be well aware of the nonrational 
appeal of the commercial and feel that it is essential for successful marketing. For example, in 
order to maintain a market for dishwasher detergent that leaves glassware "spotless," an ad-
vertiser may feel compelled to use the product commercial to reinforce the view that women 
find deep fulfillment in housework, the mastery of which includes avoiding water-spotted 
glassware. Although messages ancillary to the informational content of noncommercial speech 
are tolerated for fear of otherwise chilling speech that contributes to public debate, tighter 
regulation can operate in the context of commercial speech with little likelihood of stifling the 
protected commercial message. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. Moreover, the 
noncommercial message of advertising forfeits constitutional protection only when the adver-
tiser chooses to keep it implicit. 
250. See note 19 supra. 
251. Cf. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764-65 ("Obviously, not all commercial messages 
contain the same or even a very great public interest element. There are few to which such an 
element could not be added"). 
January 1978] Television Product Advertising 547 
m.inistered.252 
The conclusion that the deceptive and unfair appeals of televi-
sion product advertising are constitutionally regulable does not en-
sure that the particular regulatory remedy253 selected will be 
constitutionally permissible. The remedies suggested in this Note, 
however, do not appear to exceed constitutional bounds. The FTC's 
remedy of disclosure for deceptive advertising is consistent with the 
extension of constitutional protection to commercial speech. Al-
though the constitutionality of a remedy requiring disclosure was not 
passed upon by the Court, language in both Virginia Pharmacy and 
Linmark suggests that different constitutional considerations apply 
to that remedy than to an absolute ban on advertising.254 Disclosure 
requirements, of course, vindicate the public's right to commercial 
information by curing deception through the remedy of additional 
information. Although the burden of disclosure might ordinarily 
raise a first amendment question,255 the burden is not imposed ab-
. sent material deception, the regulation of which is expressly ap-
proved in the Court's recent opinions.256 
This Note has suggested that, rather than proscribing unfair ad-
vertising appeals, the better remedy for unfair advertising is usually 
corrective advertising designed to vitiate the unfairness through re-
buttal and counter-persuasion.257 Corrective advertising is also a 
more appropriate remedy than mere disclosure in some instances of 
deceptive or misleading advertising.258 The constitutional issues 
presented by corrective advertising in the context of deceptiveness 
are similar to those raised by the disclosure remedy: each requires 
the ·airing of statements regarding commercial information about the 
advertised product. Moreover, the remedy of corrective advertising 
in deceptive television product advertising has been upheld against 
constitutional challenge in a recent decision of the Court of Appeals 
252. See text at note 71 supra. The advertiser might still be held accountable to the FTC 
for the truth of factually verifiable claims for the product. See, e.g., National Commn. on Egg 
Nutrition, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 21,184 (1976), order e'!forced in part, 510 F.2d 157 (7th 
Cir. 1977). 
253. The application of the FCC's fairness doctrine to product advertising presents no con-
stitutional problems that have not already been resolved with respect to other forms of pro-
tected speech. See text at notes 78-79 supra. 
254. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court indicated that the distinctive attributes of co=er-
cial speech "may . . . make it appropriate to require that a co=eicial message appear in 
such a form, or include such additional iefonnation, warnings, and disclaimers, as are neces-
sary to prevent its being deceptive." 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (emphasis added). This language was 
noted in Linmark, 43 l U.S. at 90, where the Court stated that such requirements raise very 
different constitutional considerations than would total bans on particular types of advertise-
ments. 
255. See text at notes 262-65 infra. 
256. See text at notes 224-26 supra. 
251. See text at notes 192 & 204 supra. 
258. See text at notes 182-84 supra. 
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for the District of Columbia Circuit, Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC.259 
Citing Virginia Pharmacy for the proposition that "the First Amend-
ment presents 'no obstacle' to government regulation of false or mis-
leading advertising,"260 the court in Warner-Lambert rejected the 
contention that first amendment protection of commercial speech 
precludes the remedy of corrective advertising in deceptive advertis-
ing cases. 261 
The use of corrective advertising to counter unfairness raises 
more difficult constitutional questions, for in this context the correc-
tive advertisements, rather than merely correcting earlier impres-
sions conveyed about the characteristics of a particular product, 
would present a counterview on a social issue implicitly raised in the 
advertiser's commercials. The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit recently addressed concerns similar to those raised 
by requiring corrective advertising that goes beyond a statement of 
product characteristics to a declaration of opinion. In United States 
v. National Society of Professional Engineers,262 the court reversed 
that portion of the district court's order that required the defendant 
to state to its members that it "does not consider competitive bidding 
to be unethical. 263 In modifying the decree, the court reasoned that 
the first amendment requires that an affirmative speech remedy "not 
be more intrusive than necessary to achieve fulfillment of the gov-
ernmental interest."264 The court's primary concern was that the 
lower court's decree forced "an association of individuals to express 
as its own opinion judicially dictated ideas."265 A corrective remedy 
to unfair advertising, in contrast, need only present countervailing 
ideas which would not be represented as the views of the offending 
advertiser. With careful attention to the exigencies of particular 
cases, the FTC could readily fashion unfairness remedies "no more 
intrusive than necessary"-that is, broad enough to avoid dictating 
precise content yet strict enough to achieve the desired results.266 
259. 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1575 (1978), 
260. 562 F.2d at 758. 
261. The Supreme Court has suggested in another context that affirmative and general 
speech requirements may be constitutionally preferred to abridgements. See Buckley v, Valeo, 
424 U.S. I, 49 n.55 (1976). 
262. 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 815 (1977), 
263. 555 F.2d at 984. 
264. 555 F.2d at 984. See Warner-Lambert Co., 562 F.2d at 758: "Petitioner is correct that 
this triggers a special responsibility on the Commission to order corrective advertising only if 
the restriction inherent in its order is no greater than necessary to serve the interest involved." 
Cf. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 61 I, 618-20 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 
(1977) (prior restraints on specific content of co=ercial speech must be carefully examined). 
265. 555 F.2d at 984. The court's deference to the Society as "an association of individu-
als" may hint that, even where some affirmative remedy is warranted, the courts may be more 
reluctant to prescribe speech by persons or groups than by corporations. 
266. Banzhaf cautioned against strict prescriptions of speech, even where an affirmative 
remedy is appropriate. 405 F.2d at 1103. The court stated: 
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Critics of governmental regulation of broadcasting fear most the 
specter of governmental "propaganda" dominating the airwaves.267 
None of the proposals discussed in this Note begin to approach per-
vasive governmental control of broadcasting. Americans have a jus-
tified fear of anyone deciding for them what they "ought" to see and 
hear.268 Television broadcasting, as presently structured, forces an 
uncomfortable policy choice between delegating this decision wholly 
to corporate advertisers and permitting representative government to 
intervene on behalf of a perceived public interest. Whether called 
"education," "acculturation," or "advertising," propaganda is con-
stantly broadcast to television viewers.269 The question is whether it 
is to be accountable to the public. 
The Supreme Court has properly renounced the absolute exclu-
sion of commercial speech from constitutional protection. It has 
carefully refrained, however, from extending such protection to com-
mercial advertising in all forms and under all circumstances. Where 
television product advertising communicates only by image and in-
nuendo, it cannot claim the protection of the first amendment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The constant challenge of an evolving technological society is to 
prevent rapid innovation from outstripping the understanding and 
control of the people and their representatives. As one commentator 
has noted, ''we will either direct our technology or it will be used to 
direct us. In communications the second course has been evident for . 
some time."270 In a pluralistic, democratic society, the issues pre-
sented by pervasive television advertising conveying latent cultural 
messages are troubling. Although the problems suggest a need for 
innovative governmental response, that response has not been forth-
Finally, not only does the cigarette ruling not repress any information, it serves affirma-
tively to provide information. We do not doubt that official prescription in detail or in 
quantity of what the press must say can be as offensive to the principle of a free press as 
official prohibition. But the cigarette ruling does not dictate specific content and, in view 
of its• special context, it is not a precedent for converting broadcasting into a mouthpiece 
for government propaganda. 
267. See405 F.2d at 1103. 
268. See Jones, supra note 50, at 392. 
269. Communications scholars have long recognized the correspondence between state 
propaganda and private-sector advertising. See, e.g., Bauer, The Obstinate Audience: The I'!flu-
ence Process from the Point of View of Social Communication, 19 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 319, 319 
(1964); Lazarsfeld & Morton, surpa note 20, at 339. Klapper has stated: 
Propaganda, in short, appears wherever there are two unidentical minds and a means of 
communication. These are the simple necessary and sufficient conditions for an attempt to 
engineer consent. The current fear of propaganda is perhaps not ill-founded, but it is 
inexactly expressed. For what the guardians of the free mind really fear is not the engi-
neerini of consent, but rather that the engineering will be so successful as to bar the 
conditions for opposing engineering. The goal perilous is not consent, but unanimity. 
Klapper, 17 AM. SCHOLAR 419, supra note 17, at 420. 
270. H. SCHILLER, supra note 17, at 150. 
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coming. Apparently out of concern for the economic base of broad-
casting, the Federal Communications Commission has effectively 
excised product advertising from its mandate to regulate communi-
cations in the "public interest." The Federal Trade Commission, 
meanwhile, has been largely unwilling to confront the unfairness 
and deception of subtly implied claims and psychological appeals. 
Yet the first amendment, far from prohibiting innovative reform, 
stands for the fundamental value that reform would serve-the in-
tegrity of public discourse. 
